Research On Water-saving Incentives For Agricultural Water Resources In The Yellow River Irrigation Area Based On Stakeholders

More than 70%of China's cultivated land is distributed in perennial irrigation belts and unstable irrigation belts,and agricultural production is highly dependent on irrigation.Agriculture is a"large water user"and"large water consumer"in China,accounting for 63%of total water use.However,China is one of the 13 water-shortage countries in the world,and its water resources per capita is only 28.87%of the world level,facing the constraints of the extremely uneven distribution of water resources regarding time and space,and the deterioration of water ecology.With the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization in China,the problem of agricultural water being squeezed out is highlighted.The lack of effective protection of agricultural water will directly threaten China's food security strategy and threaten the eating of 1.39 billion people.While China's agricultural water supply is scarce,there is a problem of low efficiency of agricultural water use.Despite the slow increase in agricultural water efficiency after many efforts,it is still hovering around 0.53,which is far below the level of 0.8 in developed countries.For more than half a century,China has been striving to explore water saving in agriculture,trying to improve the efficiency of agricultural water use through various water-saving methods,but failed to achieve the expected results.There are "over delivery"phenomena throughout the year:there are old irrigation facilities and maintenance absence;irrigation management system is not smooth;management organization is bloated;water fee income is far lower than the cost of water supply;farmers' agricultural income is low;the actual water fee is much higher than the price set by governments;and governments have given water-saving subsidies for years,resulting in heavy financial burden.This paper argues that the innovation of agronomic technology and the choice of water-saving irrigation methods are important,but the most important issue is to respect and highlight the "bottom-up",interests of the various stakeholders in the process of agricultural water use,and build a new water-saving incentive mechanism which matches the national situation,inspiring the internal water-saving motives of multiple micro-subjects such as main water suppliers,main water users and the public,establishing a smooth and flexible water resources transfer market,and coordinating with clear and long-term policy regulation,to promote the efficient transfer of water resources and rational allocation,and achieve the goal of water conservation in harmony with macro and micro goals.Only by this,it is possible to:truly achieve effective water conservation;improve water use efficiency;promote a virtuous cir-cle of resources,industry and economy;achieve sustainable use of water resources to support the harmonious development of the economy and society;achieve harmony between people and water;and promote ecological civilization and agricultural modernization.This paper analyzes the agricultural water use efficiency of the irrigation area using water from the Yellow River,and analyzes the problems agricultural water saving and corresponding reasons in the D irrigation area of Shaanxi Province,and analyzes the behaviors and interest conflicts of various stakeholders when trying to maximize their own net income(net profit),providing a vivid and realistic case for constructing a water-saving incentive mechanism.From the perspective of stakeholders—the four stakeholders of the agricultural water resources utilization process:governments,water supply units,water users,and water user associations,four game models are systematically constructed and the economic optimization model is employed to analyze the interest conflicts appealing in the water-saving behaviors of each subject,which sets a theoretical deduction foundation for the water-saving incentive mechanism.Based on the theory of"potency-means-expectation",through the establishment of an orderly agricultural water rights transfer market,the formulation of a rational and flexible agricultural water price system,the definition of clear water conservancy engineering authority,the targeted positioning of water conservancy special investment funds,the setup of water supply units with clear responsibilities;the effective management of water user associations,and the reward and punishment measures for water-saving behavior of water users,to construct water-saving incentive mechanisms for agricultural water resources from aspects of institutional innovation,game rule improvement,and game payment changing.This will motivate stakeholders'endogenous water saving,make them evolve from"uncooperative"to"cooperative"to achieve the overall Pareto optimality.The control group and the inspection group are selected from the water-saving pilot project in the D irrigation area of Shaanxi Province.Based on the economic,ecological and social equity,the fuzzy mathematics method is used to test and analyze the performance of the water-saving incentive mechanism to enhance its applicability,operationality and universality.The main innovations of this paper are:innovations in analytical methods,institutional innovation and evaluation index system.(i)Innovation in analytical methods.Under the premise of economic people's"bounded rationality",this paper analyzes the economic behaviors of the main stakeholders of the water-saving process of agricultural water resources-government,water supply units in irrigation area,water users,and water user associations.It systematically builds the water-saving games between government and water supply units,between the water supply units and the farmers,between the farmers and the government,and between farmers,using the optimization analysis model to analyze the various stakeholders to realize Pareto optimality.(ii)Innovation in incentive mechanism system.This paper integrates ecological civilization,agricultural modernization and agricultural water-saving incentive mechanism.Under the background of water ecological civilization construction,new business entity rise and land intensive management,combined with management science and psychology related theory,it sets up diversified "MVEI" water-saving incentive mechanism including policy support,system improvement,organizational system,behavioral norms,and rural culture.This will not only realize the improvement of agricultural water use efficiency,but also will contribute to the modernization of agriculture and rural areas;realize the harmonious symbiosis goal between agriculture,secondary and tertiary industries,between rural areas and towns,and between people and resources;and achieve an overall Pareto improvement.(iii)Innovation in evaluation index system.This paper constructs a new performance test model for water-saving incentive mechanism.Based on the analysis of the four stakeholders of the government,water supply units,water users and water user associations,four first-level indicators and 25 second-level indicators are selected as verification indicators.From the perspectives of economy,benefit,ecology and social equity,the performance of the water-saving incentive mechanism constructed in the article is evaluated to enhance its operability and promotion.The main conclusions of this paper are that the effective incentive mechanism can stimulate the water-saving motives of each stakeholders,and encourage all their maximization of net income(net profit)to achieve synergy and the overall Pareto optimality.In this incentive mechanism,the government acts as the"leader"and;"supervisor"of water conservancy investment and water conservation behavior.Under the premise of formulating relevant regulations and clearly defining the property rights of water rights and water conservancy facilities,the mechanism gives agricultural water resources suppliers and users full rights,and activates their internal water-saving motives.Under the premise of ensuring food security and farmers'economic benefits,a"managable and loose" agricultural water resources market is established,in which water rights can be flexibly transferred(including trading,and deposits and loans),water prices can effectively reflect the value of water resources and supply and demand.and water conservancy project property rights are clearly defined.This will give full play to the water market regulation mechanism,and harmonize the interests of the micro-subjects of agricultural water resources with the government's macro-level objectives,to achieve a virtuous cycle of "government goal-instrumental incentives-micro-subject water-saving motives-stakeholders'water-saving actions-water saving-reasonable and efficient allocation of water resources".