A Study On The Choice Of Land Contract About Yield Expectation,Game Power

Land is the mother of wealth,and labor is the father of wealth.In the traditional society,land as the most basic production factor is the main source of wealth,and it is also the center of politics,society,and economy.With the collapse of the JingTian system,China's land economic system has thus entered a rent-for-private system.And in the true sense,the rapid development of the tenancy system and its long-term dominant position began with the promulgation of the two tax laws in the middle and late Tang Dynasty,which was an important reason for the Chinese economy to lead the world in the long history.But in the middle and late 19th century,the invasion of foreign capitalism and the accelerated commercialization of the rural economy resulted in some risk disperse mechanisms failure gradually,such as the disintegration of the self-sufficient natural economy,the demise of rural handicrafts,and the inter-period income transfer of integration of social networks.At the same time,there was a lack of investment in farmland infrastructure due to war.This made the natural environment more and more prominent.These changes not only did not shake the land ownership,but intensified the differentiation of the rural class.The tenancy system was the root cause of the poverty of the peasants and the weakness of the countryside.The implementation of "land to the tiller" was the primary purpose of solving the people's livelihood problem.However,historical facts showed that the modern agricultural productivity did not show a trend of recession.On the contrary,there was a situation in which both development and delay alternated in time and space.It could be seen that the land tenancy system had played an active role in the allocation of resources.However,economic theory has been focusing on the resource utilization efficiency of different types of contracts under the tenancy system.Could practical experience answer this question?Moreover,there were several kinds of contracts in similar agricultural production areas,and the transaction cost was insufficient to explain them,so what caused this result?The purpose of this paper is to analyze and explain the resource utilization,allocation and contract selection based on the land rent as the axis and the principles and tools of economics.Land rent is the transformation of excess profits,but it also faces the uncertainty of the expected land return.The main source of this uncertainty is incomplete information.In this situation,the landlord and the tenant farmer compete for land rent in order to maximize their own returns.The landlord entrusted the land to the tenant farmers and signed a contract with the tenant farmers,which may be completed under complete information and may be completed under incomplete information.But as long as the tenant is risk-neutral,the optimal choice for the game is the fixed-price contract,and the expected utility(gain)of the landlord is equal.If the tenant is risk averse,the optimal choice of game under incomplete information is divided contracts.Therefore,if one of the parties has relatively strong bargaining power,the land contract will be a favorable form for it.Based on theoretical analysis,this paper reviews the historical changes in the land tenancy system and its tenancy morphological characteristics.The conclusion is that since the middle and late Tang period,the development of the land tenancy system had been relatively stable.The local rent increase was difficult to realize,namely,the risk factors such as natural disasters cause the grain yield per mu to rise slowly or unchanged,and the bargaining ability is an important determinant of the land contract system.In the middle and late Tang Dynasty,the landlord's economic power was relatively strong and the bargaining ability was strong.Therefore,the land contract system was dominated by the fixed rent system;after the Northern Song Dynasty,the landlord's economic power weakened,the bargaining ability decreased,and the tenant's bargaining ability increased,so the land contract system was divided rent system.When the local rent has the potential to increase,that is,when the grain yield has the potential to increase,the fixed rent system is beneficial to landowners and tenants.The Southern Song Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty demonstrated this characteristic.After theoretical analysis and historical review,this paper focuses on the guiding role of land rent in resource utilization,the different contractual forms of land rent under risk conditions,and the contractual forms of land rent appreciation.The main empirical content and related conclusions are as follows:Research Content 1:The efficiency of land resource utilization between sharecropping contract and fixed contractClassical economic theory does not treat land rent as a cost of production,considering that the proportion is determined by custom.This paper corrects the tenant model,considers land rent as a part of production cost,and regards the proportion of shares as a function of the input of other elements in each unit of land.Then,the marginal cost curve of tenant farmers has changed.In the case of land homogeneity,the principle of equal marginality is used to test whether the sharecropping contract and fixed contract resources is efficient.Based on the Bucks's farm survey data,the empirical test results show that under the condition of land homogeneity,there is no significant difference in the marginal productivity of land among the sharecropping contractual tenant farmers,fixed tenant farmers,and cultivators,namely,the land resource utilization is efficient in the sharing of contract.In addition,the relative differences in the marginal productivity of the land,on the one hand,lead to changes in the rate of land tenancy,on the other hand,flexible adjustment of the scale through the tenancy system to further achieve efficient distribution of land resources.Research Content 2:Risk aversion,game power and land contract selectionThe definition of risk aversion is that when the expected average income is the same,the rational economic man tends to have smaller risk changes rather than larger ones.As the relationship between the landlord and the tenant farmer gradually becomes economic contractual,the performance of written contracts is becoming more common.Contract documents often include some clause,such as,"If the year or year fails to harvest,take into account the local precedents," and "No matter how good or bad the year is,you must not increase or decrease",which are the result of the game power between landlords and tenants.The game power between landlords and tenants determines their respective final equilibrium benefits.The Buck's farmhouse data from five provinces and 12 counties in the wheat producing areas were collected and empirically tested.The results of the study indicate that the higher the degree of risk aversion,the greater the performance of land contracts is sharecropping contracts.Under risk aversion,the higher the land rent rate,the stronger the landlord's game power,the more the land contract is expressed as a fixed contract;conversely,the lower the land rent rate,that is,the stronger the tenant's game ability,the more the land contract is sharecropping contract.Research content 3:The matching of the ability of the tenant farmer and the fixed contract"A person with permanent property has perseberance",and this "property" means property rights.Under the sharecropping contract,land ownership and management rights are in a semi-separated state,and tenants have incomplete claim rights.Therefore,incentives are limited.However,under fixed contract,land ownership and management rights are completely separated,and tenants have complete residual claim rights.There is sufficient motivation to get all the extra benefits.Land rent is the form of land ownership in economy to realize the increasing of value,which is created by labor.In the long run,if labor and land are homogenous,then the land rent market will reach a state of equilibrium.However,if the tenant labor is heterogeneous,it tends to be fixed contracts as the operating capacity increases to get all additional revenues.Landowners will also receive higher land revenue because of more excess profits.Based on the survey data of Buck's farmhouse,the empirical results show that,with the increasing in the operating capacity of the tenant farmers,land contract is mostly represented by fixed contracts.And under fixed contracts,tenants are more likely to rent more land.However,the sharecropping contract does not help the allocation of land resource to the operators with higher operating capabilities.On the whole,the 2000 years tenancy system is the choice of the two parties,which provides the basis for more free combination of production elements and more flexible resource allocation.The evolution of the tenancy pattern is a product of landlord and tenant game.Under different constraints,the landlord and the tenant based on equilibrium profit and utility maximization goal,the choice of contractual arrangement are beneficial to themselves.More importantly,a considerable portion of the land is leased by the tenant farmers with relatively strong operating capacity,which is of great significance to the current land circulation.