Putting logic back into axiological ethics

My main goal for this work is to examine an internalist (specifically: axiological) alternative to the deontic attempt at formalizing moral theory. I will discuss why it is that we need to discard the paradox-ridden deontic logic and why I have decided to go the route of axiology.;Within the bounds of axiology, the way that I propose to approach formalizing moral theory is through the type-raising of preference relations. I argue that 'ought' statements are really just a way for us to express preferences for certain states of the world, and I suggest that what we need to do in order to formalize moral theory is to find a way to go from expressing preferences over individual states of the world to expressing preferences over many states of the world at the same time. It is this transition of going from preferences between individual points to preferences between sets of points which is referred to as 'type-raising'.;I suggest three possible approaches to type-raising. I then put them through the rigours of tests established by economists to test their version of type-raising methods. From there, I look at whether my type-raising approach manages to overcome the paradoxes that were the demise of deontic logic. What I observe is that one of the type-raising schemes succeeds better than the other two, but that none of them manages to pass the test of the Prisoner's Dilemma. I then conclude that though my approach is a more promising formalization of moral theory than deontic logic, it still has some major problems to contend with.