The philosophy of science as a philosophy of music theory (Milton Babbitt, Benjamin Boretz, Michael Kassler, Matthew Brown)

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. On the one hand, it examines the role played by the philosophy of science in the development of post-war American music theory. In particular, it describes post-analytic philosophy of science as a backdrop for understanding the metatheoretical writings of musical theorists such as Milton Babbitt, Benjamin Boretz, Michael Kassler, and Matthew Brown. On the other hand, my thesis offers an internal critique of music theory's reliance on the philosophy of science. While I do not question the value of modeling musical theories according to certain principles associated with the philosophy of science, I do emphasize that we must be careful about what philosophy of science we use as a guide. Many of the views and assumptions in the philosophy of science that were adopted by writers such as Babbitt, Boretz, Kassler, and even Brown, have undergone radical changes. The construction of a “scientific image of music theory” must, I believe, reflect these changes and developments.; In Chapters 1 and 2, I describe the philosophy of science's views on theory structure (the axiomatic, or “Received View”) and explanation (the “covering-law model”). In these chapters, I critique the writings of Kassler, Boretz, and Brown and their views on theory structure and/or explanation. In Chapter 3, I describe the “physics bias” of a great deal of twentieth-century philosophy of science. This bias, I argue, presents an unnecessary limitation to what is to count as “scientific,” not only for the philosophy of science but for scientifically minded music theorists as well. Here I describe the relationship of biology to the philosophy of science by examining the concept of “function” and alternative explanatory strategies. In Chapter 4, I try to show how Arnold Schoenberg's theory of tonality can be viewed from a biological/functionalist standpoint, i.e., as a theory that offers functional—as opposed to lawfully determined—explanations. In the final chapter, I briefly consider issues relating to functional laws and psychological reduction. Finally, I argue for an instrumental conception of musical theories where any truth-claims that may be advanced by a particular theory are “framework” relative.