| Recently there plenty of research focus on the ex post financial performance of the exit threat,Dou(2016)and Chen(2018)find that blockholders could align their interest with managers’ through the channel of exiting threat,which ensure the decreasing of earning management and focusing on maximizing shareholders’ value.Jiang(2015)takes advantage of a event,which allows the state owned shares liquidate in the public market,to decrease the intention of tunneling companies by the biggest blockholder.Blockholders could be seen as private information collectors for their holding huge stake in a single company,thus the exit of blockholder is signaling the market there are great chances that the company is doomed,which would bring down the price and hurt manager badly.Owning to those consequences,we could arrive to a conclusion quite save,that the exit threat rather than real exit is powerful enough to govern the behavior of manager and increase the value of the firm.Few studies link innovation and the exit threat together.This research will shed a light on this field.No matter to a company or to a country,innovation is one of the most essencial ingredients of development.In terms of the value of a company,the exit threat should exert the positive effect on innovation.And generally speaking,most of investors are lack of knowledge to understand the tech background needed innovation,compare to the manager,thus there might be the information asymmetry between blockholder and manager,which would harm the innovation in many ways.So we assume the analysts playing information interpret role will hedge the information asymmetry to some extent,and help the transition of innovation intention to real innovation of companies.We find that the exit threat causes the increase of both innovation intention and real innovation.Further,under the mechanism of analyst works as an interpreter of complicated information related to innovation,the exit threat will work as catalysts in the process of transition from innovation intention to real innovation action.We identify one possible mechanism through which the blockholders will enhance corporate innovation: decreased information asymmetry caused by analysts and higher exit threat of blockholder acted as a monitor. |
