Research On The Impact Of The Threat Of Non-controlling Large Shareholders’ Exit On The Investment Decision Of Enterprises

Under the overall requirements of high-quality development in the new era,China’s economic development has entered a new normal.High-quality investment is an important way to promote the recovery of the economy.How to further stimulate the investment vitality of enterprises,optimize the investment structure,and improve the investment efficiency is a practical problem to be solved by listed companies.Shareholders’ participation in corporate governance is the core feature of the modern enterprise system.With the continuous progress of China’s equity reform process and the continuous improvement of the legal protection of investors,non-controlling large shareholders can participate in corporate governance through direct participation,direct exit and exit threat,and play an increasingly important role.Exit threat has become an important way for non-controlling large shareholders to participate in corporate governance.In social psychology,interest subjects use threats to express their demands and exert pressure to bargain.The ultimate goal is to maximize their own interests in the game through communication,negotiation and other means.When the active voice channel is blocked or the cost is too high,but you do not want to exit directly,you will tend to use the exit threat to change the perception of the enterprise’s decision-making subject and affect the company’s decision-making.Because non-controlling large shareholders hold more shares,their interests are closely related to the development of the enterprise,and they have the motivation and ability to pay attention to the investment decisions of the enterprise.The exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders is an important part of the ownership structure of an enterprise.As one of the three major financial decisions of an enterprise,the investment decision is related to the long-term development of the enterprise and the interests of non-controlling large shareholders,and is an important part of corporate governance.So,will the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders affect the investment decision of the enterprise? The in-depth understanding of the relationship between the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders and investment decisions provides a "inside-out" governance mechanism and a good micro-view for evaluating the impact and path of the equity structure reform on the development of the real economy,and provides empirical evidence and policy inspiration for China to further optimize the equity reform plan and the development of the stock market.At the same time,it provides new ideas for optimizing the investment decisions of enterprises and promoting their high-quality development.Therefore,the study of large shareholders based on China’s experience has realized the evolution of the theoretical research logic of equity structure and the convergence of China’s special experience.Whether the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders can affect the investment decisions of enterprises as an effective way of governance is an important issue to be studied.In view of this,this thesis,from the perspective of shareholder corporate governance,takes the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China from 2010 to 2021 as the research object,and on the basis of sorting out the reform of China’s equity system,focuses on the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders,and combines theoretical analysis,theoretical model and empirical test system to verify the governance effect of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on enterprise investment decisions.First of all,on the basis of reviewing the existing research,concept definition and institutional background,this thesis puts forward the problems studied in this thesis and analyzes them with theoretical models.Then,according to the theoretical basis and theoretical analysis of this thesis,the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on the investment decisions of enterprises is studied.Based on the two levels of investment structure and investment efficiency,the industrial,financial and innovative investment in the investment structure are specifically considered,the degree of exit threat,other governance methods of non-controlling large shareholders and the differential impact of shareholding entities are verified,and the dynamic changes of enterprise investment structure are explored,At the same time,we will deeply explore the internal mechanism of the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders,and combine the investment structure to study the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on investment efficiency.Finally,according to the conclusions of the study,it discusses how to improve the corporate governance mechanism and optimize the investment decision-making path and methods.The main research conclusions of this thesis are as follows:Firstly,as an effective governance mechanism,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders can effectively optimize the investment structure,promote industrial investment and innovative investment,inhibit the level of financial investment,and help maintain the long-term stability of enterprises through the governance effect and information effect.The above conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests.Consider the difference in the degree of exit threat: when the credibility and intensity of the exit threat are higher,the effect of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders is more significant;Consider other governance methods of non-controlling large shareholders: direct exit and exit threat have the same impact effect,but when non-controlling large shareholders directly participate in the company’s investment decisions,their motivation for exit threat is weakened;Consider the main differences of non-controlling large shareholders: institutional investors,foreign capital and the exit threat of long-term strategic large shareholders have a more significant impact.Based on the impact of China’s foreign policy,the listed companies’ shareholding reduction control policy weakened the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders,while the relaxation of the short selling control policy strengthened its governance role.Secondly,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders mainly affects various investments of enterprises by alleviating agency problems and improving the quality of information disclosure.At the same time,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders helps to optimize the investment structure of enterprises.Specifically,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders alleviates the squeeze of financial investment on industrial investment and innovation investment,which has long-term significance for the development of enterprises.Thirdly,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders helps to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises.At the same time,its optimization effect on the investment structure has a positive impact on the investment efficiency.The promotion effect of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on industrial investment has improved the investment efficiency,can inhibit over-investment and alleviate underinvestment;Its inhibiting effect on financial investment has improved the investment efficiency,which is manifested in alleviating the lack of investment;Its role in promoting innovation investment has improved the efficiency of investment,which is manifested in alleviating the lack of investment.In addition,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders can improve the efficiency of industrial investment,financial investment and innovation investment respectively.The main research contributions of this thesis are as follows:Firstly,based on the theory of shareholder activism,combined with empirical research,this study delves into the governance effects of the exit threat from non-controlling large shareholders through the use of theoretical models.The psychological concept of threat is incorporated into the governance effect mechanism of large shareholders in corporate governance.This study is a useful extension of the Chicago School’s view.It explores in detail the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on enterprise industrial investment,financial investment,innovation investment and investment efficiency.Through model analysis,the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on enterprise investment decisions is analyzed.The game and trade-off of non-controlling large shareholders,management and controlling shareholders in enterprise investment decisions are analyzed by model analysis,which lays the foundation for subsequent empirical analysis.Secondlyly,based on the segmentation perspective of non-controlling large shareholders,the research framework of enterprise investment decision-making is expanded.This study divides the investment decision into two levels: investment structure and investment efficiency.It specifically explores the relationship between the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders and enterprise industrial investment,financial investment and innovative investment.On this basis,it considers the dynamic changes of enterprise investment structure,and makes a detailed study of how the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders affects investment efficiency through investment structure.Previous studies rarely divided the investment structure of enterprises in detail and studied it together with the investment efficiency structure.This study adds detailed theoretical and empirical evidence to the research framework of enterprise investment decision-making.Thirdly,based on the different characteristics of non-controlling large shareholders and exit threats,we also focus on the heterogeneity of exit threat governance in different situations.From the perspective of non-controlling large shareholders and exit threats,this thesis explores the differentiated effects of different governance modes,different subjects and exit threats of non-controlling large shareholders.Existing studies have not considered other governance modes of non-controlling large shareholders in the framework of exit threats.This study considers the effects of their direct exit and direct participation.At the same time,different from previous studies that only considered the main characteristics of non-controlling large shareholders,this study divided them into institutional investors,natural persons,foreign capital,long-term strategic and short-term investment large shareholders based on the difference of shareholding subjects and shareholding time limit,and focused on the governance effectiveness of different degrees of exit threats.It is of positive significance to further understand the internal mechanism of the impact of heterogeneity on the governance effect of exit threats.Fourthly,based on the objective factors of the exit threat,we should pay close attention to the path mechanism of non-controlling large shareholders’ exit threat affecting investment decisions.The construction of the two paths of "non-controlling large shareholders’ exit threat-corporate governance-investment structure" and "non-controlling large shareholders’ exit threat-investment structure-investment efficiency".The non-controlling large shareholders’ exit threat can have governance effects on the investment structure by affecting the agency cost and the quality of information disclosure,and can improve the investment efficiency by optimizing the investment structure,Based on this,this study clarified the path of the impact of non-controlling exit threat on investment decision-making,and provided inspiration for optimizing investment structure and improving investment efficiency.