| Corporate governance is a game process that needs to be influenced by the economic interests of the relevant shareholders,management,creditors and other related entities.In recent years,research on corporate governance has focused more on the internal and external institutional environment and corporate characteristics,which has rarely studied the governance role of external large shareholders from the perspective of social psychology.The governance mechanism of external large shareholders withdrawing from threats first appeared in developed countries in the West.The securities market they owned was more mature,and the threat of external large shareholders to withdraw from the crisis could play a good role in governance.However,China is in an emerging market,the securities market system is still not perfect,and the company’s shareholding structure is characterized by a high concentration or even a monopoly.If the external large shareholders withdraw from the threat,whether this governance mechanism can effectively play its role in the Chinese market needs further explore.Therefore,from the perspective of the withdrawal of external large shareholders,this paper studies its governance effect on the company,discusses whether the external large shareholder withdrawal threat can reduce the non-efficiency investment behavior of the enterprise,thereby improving the value of the enterprise,aiming at the equity governance mechanism of China.Provide a new insight.This paper takes the data of all A-share listed companies of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017 as the original sample,and excludes the financial and insurance industry.After screening and collating relevant data,studying the impact of the external major shareholder’s withdrawal threat degree on the company’s inefficient investment,and joining the three factors of property rights,internal executives’ shareholding and external analysts’ attention,and explore the adjustment effect of their relationship.Through theestablishment of models and regression analysis,this paper finds that:(1)The threat of external large shareholders can effectively exert its governance effect,which can play a deterrent effect on the self-interested behavior of the management of the enterprise,thereby increasing the efficiency of enterprise investment.(2)Considering the nature of property rights,it is found that due to institutional factors,state-owned enterprises have less control effect on the withdrawal of major shareholders than non-state-owned enterprises.(3)The higher the proportion of corporate executives,the greater the relationship between executive personal wealth and corporate value.When the major shareholder withdraws,the personal interests of the executives will be more affected by the fluctuation of the stock price,which makes the external large shareholders’ withdrawal effect of the threat more obvious,and has a greater impact on the inefficient investment behavior of the enterprise.Therefore,in order to prevent personal interests from being affected by the withdrawal of external major shareholders,management will adopt more effective investment decisions,increase the investment efficiency of enterprises,and thus increase the value of stocks.(4)This paper also introduces analysts to pay attention to this external variable of the enterprise.The research finds that analysts pay attention to increase the transparency of corporate information,thereby improving the liquidity of stocks,making the exit behavior of external large shareholders more credible,leading to the external externalities faced by enterprises.The increase in shareholder withdrawal threats has finally strengthened the governance effect of external large shareholders’ withdrawal threats and significantly improved corporate investment efficiency.This paper confirms the effectiveness of the governance mechanism of large shareholders’ withdrawal from threats in China’s emerging markets,enriches the research of equity governance,and provides certain reference value for improving corporate governance and improving China’s securities market system. |
