| With the completion of the shareholding reform and the expansion of the financing and securities system,the liquidity of shares in China’s capital market has increased significantly,which has facilitated the exit of external major shareholders from enterprises and enhanced the credibility of the "exit threat".In recent years,domestic and international research has shown that the threat of exit by external major shareholders can alleviate agency problems between management and shareholders,thereby achieving corporate governance.Expense stickiness reflects a enterprise’s cost management behaviour and provides clues to reveal management’s resource adjustment decisions,and management’s self-interest in resource allocation can increase the stickiness of a enterprise’s expenses.Can the deterrent effect of external major shareholders prior to their exit then lead to a reduction in management’s opportunistic behaviour,which in turn has a dampening effect on expense stickiness? The thesis explores this question in depth.The thesis firstly reviews the relevant studies on the economic consequences of the threat of external major shareholders exit and the factors influencing expense stickiness,and then constructs a theoretical analysis framework on the impact of the threat of external major shareholders exit on enterprise expense stickiness based on principal-agent theory,cost-natured theory,information asymmetry theory and signaling theory.Using data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2020,the thesis empirically examines the impact of external major shareholders exit threat on enterprise expense stickiness using OLS regressions,mediating effects and fixed effects.The study finds that:(1)the exit threat of external major shareholders can suppress enterprise expense stickiness.The exit threat of strategic external major shareholders is more effective than the exit threat of profitseeking external major shareholders in suppressing expense stickiness;(2)the exit threat of external major shareholders suppresses expense stickiness by reducing management’s self-interest;(3)furthermore,the thesis conducts a heterogeneity analysis in terms of the nature of ownership,management’s shareholding and the degree of marketization,and finds that in non-state owned enterprises,management’s shareholding and enterprises with a low degree of marketization(3)furthermore,the thesis conducts a heterogeneous analysis in terms of the nature of ownership,management shareholding and the degree of marketization,and finds that the suppression of expense stickiness by the threat of exit of external major shareholders is more significant in non-state owned enterprises,enterprises with management shareholding and enterprises with high marketization.Finally,based on the findings of the study,the thesis proposes recommendations to rationalise the shareholder structure and shareholding allocation,strengthen internal enterprise governance and accelerate the marketisation process.The thesis explores the influence of the threat of exit of external major shareholders on the cost management behavior of enterprises from the perspective of expense stickiness,expands the research field of the influence of exit threat on enterprise decision making and the research framework of the relationship between the type of shareholders influencing exit threat and expense stickiness,reveals the mechanism of the influence of the threat of exit of external major shareholders on the expense stickiness of enterprises,which is conducive to the full understanding of the influence of external major shareholders on corporate decision making,and promotes the optimization of corporate governance mechanism and the improvement of resource allocation efficiency.The thesis has 1 figure,16 tables and 117 references. |
