The Game Theory Analysis On The Knowledge Transfer From The Senior Management Of Family Business To The Second-generation Successor

Family business is an ancient form of business organization,which has a long history and has a far-reaching impact on the history of enterprise development.Today,about 90% of the world's businesses are family businesses.One of the most important activities of family business is succession process,which has a high failure rate.According to statistics,only 30% of them can succeed in inheritance once.Therefore,how to improve the success rate of family business succession process is a focus of family business related research.At present,the related research of family business mainly focuses on two points: One is the transfer of ownership and management right in the succession process;The second point is the succession transfer of enterprise knowledge in the process of succession.At the succession process of family business,whether the knowledge about business operation and development mastered by business managers can be spread smoothly plays a very important role in the success of succession process of family business.This study considers that the completion of the succession process of family business not only depends on whether the ownership and management rights of the enterprise are completely transferred to the second-generation successors,but also on whether the knowledge about enterprise management and development mastered by the first-generation managers of the enterprise has been successfully spread to the second-generation successors,because these knowledge is very important for enterprises to maintain market competitiveness and stable development.At the same time,this study also notes that the senior management of family business is composed of family members and a small number of nonfamily professional managers,which help shareholders to complete the daily management activities.Therefore,when the second-generation successor takes over the family business,it is necessary to seek knowledge sharing from the two groups in the senior management.Because of their own attributes and enterprise emotions,family members and non-family managers will have different game processes when they cooperate with the second-generation successor in knowledge transfer.This study mainly uses game theory,numerical analysis and case analysis.The results show that the conservative second-generation successor is more likely to cooperate with the nonfamily professional manager,and the higher the salary of the nonfamily manager,the higher probability of judging the successor is conservative,and the higher the willingness to cooperate.The knowledge transfer cooperation between the members of the executive family and the second-generation successors may or may not be fully cooperative.The rate of knowledge transfer,which is controlled by the ability of knowledge transfer and learning ability of the second-generation successors,will positively affect the willingness of knowledge transfer.Higher cost of knowledge transfer will inhibit knowledge transfer within the organization.The ratio of knowledge receiving controlled by the factors of knowledge receiving ability and willingness is positively related to the willingness of knowledge receiving.High cost of knowledge receiving will restrain the knowledge receiver from receiving knowledge.The establishment of knowledge transfer path is very necessary,but it is not suitable to invest too high cost,otherwise it will backfire.