| At present,China's economic development has entered into a new normal.It is an important task for China's economic development to further adjust its economic structure and ensure stable economic development.In this process,government investment in the construction of public infrastructure has become an important means to achieve economic development goals.agent-construction project,as a project management mode developed from the administrative management of government invested construction projects to market-oriented management,has been popularized rapidly in China,which has changed the phenomenon of low performance of project management caused by the integration of "investment,construction,management and use" in the past,and has achieved certain results.Agent-construction project has experienced a rapid development to a steady development process,and now it has entered the stage of optimized development.In order to meet the requirements of comprehensively deepening system reform,transforming government functions and improving the efficiency of government investment,agent-construction project need to further improve performance.On the basis of the literature research,this study analyzes the agency relationship between the principal and the agent in the agent-construction project,which is in line with the economic sense.That is to say,the behavior that the principal grants some decision-making rights to the agent is a contractual relationship.Based on the basic theoretical hypothesis of "the contractor" in transaction cost theory(TCE),the specific performance is bounded rationality and opportunism,so the generation of agent-construction project includes principal-agent problems,Adverse selection and Moral hazard,and "hold-up".Using the governance theory of TCE,that is,"analyzing the characteristics of transactions-selecting governance mechanism for transactions-obtaining economic performance",this paper analyzes the characteristics of agent-construction projects and the mechanism of problems from the transaction dimensions of asset specificity,uncertainty and complexity,introduces the concept of "governance" into agent-construction project,asset specificity analyzes the contractual governance of agent-construction project from two dimensions: the strictness of contract terms and the strictness of contract execution,asset specificity analyzes the relational governance of agent-construction project from two dimensions of communication and cooperation.This study establish the analysis framework and the relationship model between governance mechanism and performance,and puts forward the research hypothesis of contractual governance and relational governance to improve the performance of agent-construction project.This study designed a set of questionnaires,through correlation analysis and regression analysis of 139 valid data,respectively,to empirically test the relationship between the governance mechanism and performance of agent construction projects,the relationship between influencing factors and governance mechanism.This study also practices the effect of contractual governance and relational governance on agent construction project performance through cases.The conclusions of this study include: the contractual governance mechanism of agent-construction project has two dimensions: the strictness of contract terms and the strictness of contract execution,and the relational governance mechanism has two dimensions: communication and contract,the asset specificity and complexity of agent-construction project have a positive impact on contractual governance and relational governance.The degree of contractual governance and relational governance has a positive correlation with the performance of agent-construction project,and their joint action also has a positive correlation with the performance,which is the governance way to improve the performance of agent-construction project. |
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