Incentive Mechanism For Tacit Knowledge Sharing Of Enterprise Apprenticeship Under Risk Aversion

Knowledge as the foundation of modern economy has become the most critical resource for enterprises to create and sustain their competitive advantage.The individual knowledge sharing and diffusion are necessitated to enterprises.By knowledge sharing,individuals,within the enterprise,are able to acquire the knowledge effectively and complete work efficiently.Explicit and tacit knowledge coexist in the enterprise,tacit knowledge,however,is critical to enterprises' competition.Therefore,how can enterprises stimulate tacit knowledge sharing within enterprise is vital to generate their competitive advantage.Mentorship,as one of the forms of tacit knowledge sharing,its efficiency for promoting enterprises' business performance has been confirmed.However,the phenomenon of mentors retaining their tacit knowledge to their students and the inertia of students who depend too much on their mentors exist in the knowledge sharing process.Therefore,how to create an effective motivate mechanism to stimulate the tacit knowledge sharing between mentors and students,and hence maximize the enterprise revenue,is a critical problem.This research firstly studied the impact of the risk aversion of mentorship on the effort level of both sides of mentorship,the contract coefficient of enterprise incentives,and the revenue condition under the centralized motive mechanism.This research has found that enterprise revenue is negatively related to the risk aversion of both sides of mentorship,and the optimal contract coefficient of both sides of mentorship can only be affected by the degree of risk aversion of mentors and students respectively.The effort level of mentors who complete their work by themselves or collaboratively complete the work with their students is negatively related to the risk aversion of mentors.Moreover,by comparing the effort level of mentors who complete their work by themselves or collaboratively complete the work with their students,this research has found that the ratio of output coefficient of both sides of mentorship would affect the effort level of mentors to complete the work by themselves or with their students.Nevertheless,the effort level of students is negatively related to the risk aversion of both sides of mentorship.This research further studied the decentralized motivate mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing between mentors and students under the risk aversion situation,and focused on the analysis of the impact of risk aversion of mentorship on the optimalincentive of contract coefficient and the effort level of work of both sides of mentorship.This research has found that the target of optimal contract coefficient,set by enterprises,for mentors is negatively related to the risk aversion of both sides of mentorship.The target of revenue sharing coefficient,set by mentors,for students is negatively related to the risk aversion of students and positively related to that of mentors.The effort level of completing work by mentors is negatively related to the risk aversion of mentors.The effort level of mentors who collaboratively work with their students changes along with the change of risk aversion of mentors,it is,however,constantly and negatively related to the risk aversion of students.The risk aversion of students is constantly and negatively related to the risk aversion of both sides of mentorship.Lastly,the enterprise revenue and the effort level of tacit knowledge sharing between mentors and students under both centralization and decentralization of motivate mechanism had been compared.And this research found that both the enterprise revenue and effort level of tacit knowledge sharing between mentors and students under the decentralized motivate mechanism constantly greater than that under the centralized motivate mechanism.