Study On Supply Chain Quality And Price Game Considering Retailer Risk Aversion

With the rapid development of economic globalization,enterprise competition is intensifying,and reasonable pricing strategies and quality strategies are one of the effective ways for enterprises to establish competitive advantage.Enterprises face various internal and external uncertainties,and risk decision-making has become a hot topic of discussion today.With the rise of the network economy,many companies have embarked on e-commerce to open up electronic channels for dual-channel operations.In order to study the impact of supply chain member risk aversion behavior on supply chain quality and price decision,we established three models of quality and price game of supply chain system in the environment of considering retailer risk aversion factor and random market,involving single channel,horizontally integrated double-channels and partly integrated double-channels.The optimal solution of the model is obtained by Stackelberg game theory,and the static analysis of the optimal solution of the model is carried out.The optimal numerical examples are used to analyze the influence of each parameter on the optimal expected profit and utility.The main research contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)In the single-channel supply chain quality and price game model considering retailer risk aversion,the degree of risk aversion of the retailer and the degree of market risk are favorable to the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price,the manufacturer's optimal quality level and the optimal expected market demand.,while the retailer's unit sales cost is reversed.(2)In the quality and price game model of the horizontally integrated dual-channel supply chain considering retailer risk aversion,the degree of risk aversion of retailers and the degree of market risk have a positive impact on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price,the manufacturer's optimal quality level,the traditional channel's optimal expected market demand and the electronic channel's optimal expected market demand,while the traditional channel unit sales cost is reversed.(3)In the quality and price game model of partly integrated dual-channel supply chain considering retailer risk aversion,the retailer's risk aversion degree and market risk degree are the best wholesale price for manufacturers,the best quality level for manufacturers,and the most electronic channels.The favorable sales price demand and the optimal expected market demand of the traditional channel have a favorable impact,while the traditional channel unit sales cost is reversed.