Executives-Employee Salary GAP And Performance Of State-Owned Enterprises

Based on the relevant research data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stocks from 2012 to 2016,this paper analyzes the impact of executive-employee pay gap on the performance of state-owned enterprises through the marginal pay effect diminishing model.The final result is that there is an inverted "U" relationship between the salary gap of the enterprise executives-employees and the organizational performance of the enterprise.And this inverted "U" relationship is in both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises at the same time.However,among companies of different natures,their performance is not the same as the sensitivity of the pay gap under the same strength.Among them,the performance of onon-state-owned enterprises is more sensitive to the expansion of the pay gap.This paper then discusses possible endogenous problems and finally decides to use the tool variable method to control and improve endogenous problems.After perfecting the model's robustness,this paper continues to explore the relevant mechanisms of the pay gap effect on corporate performance,and uses the 2SLS estimation method to conduct specific research and analysis.It was found that due to the existence of welfare dividends,the basic wages of state-owned enterprise employees were subsidized,so the employees of state-owned enterprises had higher tolerance limits than the employees of non-state-owned enterprises.In addition,because “invisible welfare” occupies a strong proportion in the remuneration of employees in the state-owned enterprises,the effect of bonus benefits is greater than the basic salary of employees.At the same time,due to the different levels of bonus benefits in different industries,the performances of enterprises in different industries are also very diverse.Finally,we used the DID model to evaluate the effect of the policy,and found that the “limit pay order” in 2014 played a role in weakening the pay gap,but this effect is not static during different periods of policy implementation: In the first short period of time,the implementation of the “restricted salary order” experienced a sudden rise and achieved the maximum effect of the policy in 2015.Over the long period of time,the policy effect showed a gradual decline in the decline process over time.The research results in this paper are conducive to providing a theoretical basis for the establishment of an effective compensation system for listed companies,and provide relevant guidance for the reform of the state-owned enterprise compensation system.It is also conducive to promoting fair development of society and quelling the increasingly public opinion.