| With the deeper reform of state-owned enterprise, it has gained more and more attention about how to motivate the executives. In recent years, there are many researches about the compensation mechanism of executives. But most of these researches are for non-state-owned enterprise and listed company. A group, a large state-owned holding company which was transferred from a government department, is chosen as a case in this thesis to study the compensation mechanism of executives of non-listed state-owned enterprise. And a new compensation incentive model which comprises annual salary system and phantom stock plan is designed.This thesis thinks that only a compound incentive model which combines short-term incentive with long-term incentive can solve the principal-agent problem. And both short-term incentive and long-term incentive have different characteristic in non-listed state-owned enterprise and non-state-owned enterprise or listed company. An incentive scheme which aim at non-list state-owned enterprise should be designed.In the aspect of short-term incentive, this thesis thinks there should be a kind of short-term incentive named"annual salary for reform of state-owned enterprise"to motivate executives for their contribution in enterprise reform and public commissions, because state-owned enterprise has dual characteristics of the profitability and public benefit. At the time of pursuing the profit, it still needs to carry the complex reform role and undertake many social public commissions. So the short-term incentive of executives is made up of annual basic salary, annual performance salary and annual salary for reform of state-owned enterprise. Annual basic salary depends upon enterprise scale. Annual performance salary depends upon the accomplishment rate of the financial budget. Annual salary for reform of state-owned enterprise depends upon accomplishment rate of reform task and other social public commissions.In the aspect of long-term incentive, this thesis designs a phantom stock plan for executives, because property of non-listed state-owned enterprise is not separated into shares and can not assess the value according the stock price as the listed company. An account is set up to record the phantom stock which exists as the proportion of the enterprise's net asset. The amount of phantom stock changes every year. Theory of EVA (economic value added) is introduced in the design of phantom stock and formula of the capital cost rate is simplified. This make design of phantom stock more scientific and easier to put into practice.In the end of this thesis, some subjects are discussed. Such as particularity in compensation mechanism that the CPC organization of state-owned enterprise brings, how to transfer the phantom stock when the enterprise become a listed company, how to design the compensation scheme for executives of deficit enterprise, impact of the functionary consumption, supervision and restriction mechanism etc..The innovation of this thesis is put forward the conception of"annual salary for reform of state-owned enterprise", introduce phantom stock plan to the non-listed state-owned enterprise, simplify the formula of capital cost rate to use theory of EVA more effectively while introduce the theory to design the phantom stock plan. |
