The Impact Of Ownership Structure On The Inefficient Investment Behavior Of Listed Companies In Strategic Emerging Industries

The global economic pattern is undergoing profound changes.New technologies and new industries are developing rapidly.A new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation has been bred and promoted.Major countries and regions have focused on strategic emerging industries in order to seize the commanding heights of future development of science and technology and industry.Developing strategic emerging industries is an important measure and strategic task for China to cultivate new growth points,establish new international competitive advantages and actively adapt to the new normal economic development.At the micro level,the investment efficiency of Listed Companies in strategic emerging industries is the key to the development of strategic emerging industries.Because of asymmetric information and principal-agent problems,the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is common.So can enterprises restrain inefficient investment by establishing a sound equity governance mechanism and strengthening the supervision of the board of directors? If so,how can a listed company establish a sound equity management mechanism? Moreover,in different life cycles,the development of enterprises will be different,and the performance of inefficient investment behavior will also be different.What is the unique effect of equity governance mechanism on inefficient investment behavior in different life cycle stages?In order to further answer the above questions,this paper first reviews the achievements and problems of current research through literature review,then uses the empirical data of Listed Companies in strategic emerging industries in China from 2014 to 2017,and uses Richardson model to measure the degree of inefficient investment of enterprises,when the residual of regression estimation is large.When the residual of regression estimation is less than 0,it indicates that the enterprise is underinvested.Then,Richardson model is modified according to the factors that measure the ownership structure,and the modified model is used to explore the impact of ownership structure on inefficient investment behavior.Finally,this paper uses the comprehensive scoring method to divide the life cycle of enterprises,and explores the differences of the impact of enterprises on inefficient investment behavior in different life cycles.Based on theoretical analysis and empirical test,the paper draws the following conclusions:Firstly,absolute concentration of equity can inhibit the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises.Relative concentration of equity will aggravate the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises in general.Equity checks and balances can inhibit the inefficient investment of enterprises.The impact of the nature of equity on the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is very limited.Second,free cash flow can effectively restrain over-investment.The more cash state-owned enterprises hold,the more inefficient investment behavior can be avoided.Third,ownership structure has the most significant impact on inefficient investment behavior at maturity.Finally,this paper combines the dynamic perspective of life cycle theory to analyze the impact of inefficient investment behavior of ownership structure and financial structure in different stages of life cycle,so as to provide reasonable suggestions for reducing inefficient behavior of Listed Companies in strategic emerging industries.