Research On The Inefficient Investment Behavior Of The State-Owned Enterprises

At present, The reform of China's state-owned enterprises (hereinafter called SOEs) is at a critical period. The special system of China decides the present situation of inefficient investment behavior of the SOEs, It has brought serious negative effects to the sustainable development of Chinese economy. In order to provide the theoretical principle and practical guidance for the investment behavior of the SOEs, This text presents a systematic study on the inefficient investment behavior and its control measures of the SOEs.Firstly, This article devotes a theoretical discussion on how to achieve an efficient investment on the SOEs. It demonstrates that the nation's shareholder wealth maximization is the rational objective of financial management for the SOEs; it defines the meaning of the objective of the nation's shareholder wealth maximization; and it analyses the differences of the nation's shareholders in SOEs and the individual shareholders in non-state-owned enterprises. On the basis of the above analyses, this text makes a theoretical discussion on the implementation mechanism of the objectives of the nation's shareholder wealth maximization on the SOEs and how to achieve an efficient investment on the SOEs, and this will provide some theoretical bases for the investment behavior of the SOEs.Subsequently, this article analyses the inefficient investment behavior of the SOEs. first of all, it analyses the present situation of the investment efficiency of the SOEs from the macro data. secondly, it defines and clarifies the concept of the inefficient investment behavior of the enterprise from the micro perspective, it as well as analyses the criterions that how to judge the corporate inefficient investment behavior. Finally, the text takes the nation's shareholder wealth maximization objective as a judgement criterion, in accordance with the different marketable degree on the State-owned enterprises, the paper establishes two estimation Models to judge the inefficient investments behavior of the SOEs in different premises separately. So, we conduct an empirical analysis on inefficient investments of the SOEs. Based on the estimation results of the financial objective index of SOEs, we verify the prevalence of non-efficient investment behavior of the SOEs in China.In the discussion of the governance mechanisms for inefficient investment behavior of the SOEs, this text uses some empirical research methods. After analyzing the dividend policy,cash flow management and share ownership structure of the SOEs in our country, The results showed that: dividend policies play an important role in the constraining management of non-efficient investment behavior of the SOEs; and in the share ownership structure, properly intensive share ownership structure can promote the efficiency level of corporate governance, the state shareholders cannot control the inefficient investment behavior of the SOEs, while the state-owned legal person shareholders can advance the constraining management of non-efficient investment behavior of the SOEs.Finally, based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some valuable suggestions of the prevention and governance of inefficient investment of Chinese SOEs. such as the establishment and promotion of the dividend policy system and the optimization of the share ownership structure of the SOEs.