The Correlation Of Executive Compensation And Corporate Performance In Financing Constraints Situation

In corporate governance,how to improve enterprise performance by executive incentive,enhancing the correlation of executive compensation and enterprise performance have been the focus of theoretical and practical circles.Previous studies have found that the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is affected by a lot of factors,such as company scale,financing costs,governance structure,industry characteristics,ownership structure,etc.Founds is indispensable resources of operating enterprises.Effective capital operation can significantly improve enterprise performance,but the objective existence of asymmetric information makes the external investors cannot fully learn the interior effective information of enterprise,causing many companies are faced with external financing constraints.It's hard for enterprises to access to capital at any time when the demand occurs.The presence of financing constraints will restrict corporate behavior and affect enterprise performance.Furthermore,corporate behavior is often closely related to corporate executives.Therefore,this thesis tries to study the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance in financing constraints situation.Firstly,the thesis has carried on the related literature about financing constraints,executive compensation and corporate performance both at home and abroad,on this basis,the thesis determined the research contents and methods.Secondly,the thesis defined the financing constraints,the executive compensation and corporate performance,and stated the related theories in detail.As the theoretical support,the thesis discussed objective existence of financing constraints and its influence mechanism on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance.Third,the thesis proposed the research hypothesizes based on theoretical analysis and designed the empirical model,using the binary logistic regression analysis indicators design financing constraints.Fourth,the thesis carried on empirical analysis.The research objects of this thesis are A-share listed companies and they are divided into different groups according to different nature of the owners and different industries.Then the thesis studied the different groups' correlation of executive compensation(including cash compensation of executives and shareholding compensation ofexecutives)and corporate performance in financing constraints situation.In the end,the thesis came up with the research conclusion and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.The results show: Firstly,the correlation between cash compensation of executives and corporate performance was significantly positive and the correlation between shareholding compensation of executives and corporate performance was not significant.Secondly,financing constraints have a significant impact on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies.Both in the private listed companies and in the state-owned listed companies,whether in high financing constraint groups or in low financing constraint groups,the correlation between cash compensation of executives and corporate performance was significantly positive,and the correlation in high financing constraint groups was more significant.In the private listed companies,the correlation between shareholding compensation of executives and corporate performance was not significant.In the state-owned listed companies,the correlation between shareholding compensation and enterprise performance was not significant in the high financing constraint groups,but in the low financing constraint groups,the correlation between shareholding compensation and enterprise performance was significantly positive.Third,both in state-owned listed companies and private listed companies,the impacts of financing constraints on correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance was different in different industries.