The Research On Impact Of Board Characteristics Of The State-owned Listed Companies On Executive Compensation Performance

The success or failure of the enterprise has very close ties with senior management.In order to make the decision-making of executives for listed companies to maximize the interests of shareholders, we should reasonably designedincentive and restraint mechanisms of the listed companies.In many incentives, incentive pay for executives is veryimportant.Based on company performance, establishing reasonable executive remuneration system，not only be ableto be an effective incentive for executives of listed companies, but also guidelines for the behavior of seniormanagement to solve the principal-agent problem of listed companies, to improve the level of performance of thelisted companies.However, in recent years, the remuneration of senior executives and the performance of listedcompanies do not match, and this caused a great concern of the media on the pay levels of senior management.Theboard of directors is the core of corporate governance department, one of its most important functions is to develop theremuneration of senior management, and raise the level of executive compensation performance depends on theeffectiveness of the governance of the Board.Well, in developing the remuneration of senior management, the boardof directors plays what role,what kind of impact the characteristics of executive compensation performance of theBoard，this paper mainly discusses the problem.Firstly, starting from both foreign and domestic, and summarized the previous literature, Elaborated the conceptof state-owned listed companies, board characteristics, executive compensation and performance, and explain therelevant theory；Then, this paper analyzes the status of the remuneration of Board Characteristics and executives ofstate-owned listed companies，empirical analysis of executive compensation performance based on this theory, usethe data of2009-2011in Shanghai and Shenzhen State-owned listed companies，their descriptive statistical analysis,correlation test and regression analysis from the stake of directors, board size, frequency of board meetings, theleadership structure of the Board, Board Independence, the Remuneration Committee of the settings, etc.Thefollowing conclusions：（1）Showed a significant positive correlation between the stake of the Board of Directors,the size of the board and executive pay levels, and with the presence of executive compensation performancesignificantly negative correlation;（2）Larger when the Board meeting frequency, the higher level of executivecompensation; sensitivity analysis, the study found that reducing the frequency of meetings of the Board can improvethe performance of executive compensation;（3）In the leadership structure of the Board of Directors, executive payfound no significant relationship, but the chairman and general manager of the implementation of the separation of thetwo roles can effectively improve the performance of executive compensation;(4)The independence of the Board, thestudy found that with the increase in the proportion of independent directors, a strong upward trend in the performance of executive pay;(5)Remuneration Committee set found the opposite conclusion and assumptions, that the presenceof executive compensation performance significantly negatively correlated.Finally, from the results of the empiricalanalysis put forward six suggestions to improve the performance of executive compensation:Rational design of thestake of the Board of Directors and incentive systems, Reasonable to determine the size of the board,Maintain anappropriate frequency of meetings of the Board of Directors,Improve the leadership structure of the board,Improvethe independence of the board of directors,and to strengthen the construction of the Remuneration Committee.