The Empirical Analysis Of The Relationship Between Executive Compensation And The Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies In China

Modern enterprise’s capital contains property capital and human capital, In the changing international environmental, industry and technology is developing rapidly, human capital is the core capital of modern enterprise, and executive is undoubtedly the core of human capital, So how to encourage executives to work hard became an important topic of Modern Enterprise Theory. Link the executive staff and executive performance is one of the most important method. Using Chinese listed company’s annual pay executives shareholding, Create a encouragement mechanism suitable for Chinese national conditions, then further improve the corporate governance of listed companies,would have very important practical significance.This dissertation, begin with the theory analysis of principal-agent theory, human capital theory of property rights and incentive mechanism, combined with our country’s special political and economic system, using qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, research the relationship between Chinese listed company executive compensation and corporate performance. Because the sample data、model and variable is different, theoretical result is also different from each other. This article selects the Chinese2009A-share data as samples, Using SPSS software for statistical data processing analysis, research the relevant of executive pay and performance of the company. The different background of state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company will result a different governance mechanism, So using comparative analysis can find out the impact of governance mechanism on salary incentive.This dissertation is divided into five parts, the first part is the introduction, including the research background、significance and methods. The second part is the literature review, including enterprise executives incentive and the general theory of the relationship between enterprise executive pay and performance. The third part is the theoretical analysis of the relationship between listed companies on Chinese executive compensation and corporate performance, based on the theory of correlation analysis. The fourth part is the empirical research of the relationship between listed company’s executive compensation and the performance. The fifth part is research conclusions and policy Suggestions, which maybe helpful to Chinese corporate governance mechanism.By using theoretical and empirical analysis, this dissertation have conclusions as follow:there is a relationship between the executive compensation and the business performance of listed companies, this means the listed companies in China has basically formed the "salary-performance contract", and the salary incentive has a impact on the performance of companies, but the incentive effect remains to be ascension. The state-owned listed company executive pay is less than the non-state-owned listed company executive pay; also the state-owned listed company’s salary incentive effect is less than non-state-owned listed company’s salary incentive effect. Therefore, we suggested that Chinese listed companies needs to establish executive salary incentive mechanism, and the state-owned listed companies needs to improve the executive compensation standard and corporate governance mechanism, in order to improve the state-owned listed company executive’s salary incentive effect.