Research On Executive Compensation Incentive Of State-owned Listed Companies

State-owned listed companies play a crucial role in the operation of Chinese national economy.The salary system and employee incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises have been the focus of deepening reform of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,it is of inestimable significance to explore effective ways of executive compensation incentive of state-owned listed companies.Research on executive compensation generally presents the development direction of pluralism,interdisciplinary,most studies based on the principal-agent theory,human capital theory,efficiency wage theory,tournament theory and managerial power theory,equity theory and other relevant theories.Varied in historical background,sample types,methods and other aspects of the research on executive compensation,many studies have reached a consensus in some aspects and obtained results with theoretical and practical significance,which have also generated differences on some issues.Based on the current situation of the executive compensation system of China's state-owned listed companies,this paper applies the research method of combining theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to explore the incentive problem of executive compensation of China's state-owned listed companies.Through the analysis of the factors affecting the executive compensation,the following conclusions are obtained:first,government policies have significant positive effects on the executive compensation of the two types of state-owned listed companies.Second,the impact of business performance on executive compensation varies from company to company.The business performance of commercial state-owned listed companies has a significant positive impact on executive compensation,while the business performance of public welfare state-owned listed companies has no significant relationship with executive compensation.Thirdly,the pay gap between senior executives and ordinary employees has a significant negative impact on the executive compensation of the two types of state-owned listed companies.Fourth,there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation of public welfare state-owned listed companies and in-service consumption,while there is no significant correlation between executive compensation of commercial state-owned listed companies and in-service consumption.Through empirical analysis,it is also found that,first,for commercial state-owned listed companies,the higher the profit that the public administration department discovers that the executives of this type of false performance behavior brings,the greater the loss that the public administration department does not inspect,the higher the probability that the public administration department carries out the inspection,and the lower the probability that the executives create false performance behavior;The more the public administration department penalizes the executives of commercial state-owned listed companies for creating false performance behaviors,the lower the probability of the executives creating false performance behaviors and the lower the probability of the public administration department carrying out inspections.Secondly,for public welfare state-owned listed companies,the higher the income that the executives of this type increase in on-the-job consumption behavior,the greater the loss that they do not inspect will be.Then,the probability of the implementation of inspection by public administration departments will be increased,and the probability of the executives' increasing on-the-job consumption behavior will be reduced.The more the public administration departments punish the executives of public welfare state-owned listed companies for creating false performance behaviors,the lower the probability that the executives will increase their in-service consumption behaviors and the lower the probability that the public administration departments will carry out inspections.Based on the conclusion of the research,the management Suggestions for commercial and public welfare state-owned listed companies are put forward.