Evolutionary Game Analysis And Mechanism Design Of Enterprises' Generic Technology R&D

With the rapid development of economic globalization,the factors flow rapidly both international and domestic,the competition is becoming more and more fiercer.Only with a wealth of scientific and technological resources,can the state and enterprises survive and develop better in such a severe environment,and the production of new technology can meet this demand.Generic technology as a “before the industrialization of technology”,is the basis of the whole technological innovation chain,and it's the key to the new technology.Both domestic and aboard attach great importance to it.However,since generic technology is a “quasi-public goods”,has externality,the outcome is likely to cause spills;and it also has the following characteristics: high investment,long time from R&D to the industrialization,great market uncertainty,these features make the enterprise to generic technology R&D investment enthusiasm is not high,and result in insufficient supply of generic technology.How to promote the enthusiasm,and resolve the dilemma of generic technology supply,which has become a significant issue facing the enterprise,industry and country.In view of the current shortage situation of generic technology supply,firstly,from the externality of enterprise generic technology R&D and production,integrating the concept of the evolutionary game of public goods,we first construct the enterprise individual generic technology R&D game model,and then expand the model to build a model of enterprise generic technology R&D with group structure.Secondly,use the Java software simulate,intuitive and comparative analysis enterprise generic technology R&D strategy change with group structure before and after.Finally,the research on the factors that affect the generic technology R&D of the enterprise,design incentive mechanism,and put forward to promote enterprise generic technology R&D of production activities of the policy recommendations for government and enterprises.From the study,we can get the following conclusions: when there is no group structure between multiple enterprises,the average investment of enterprise for generic technology R&D will tend to zero;when there is group structure in enterprise cluster,the average investment of enterprise cluster for generic technology R&D will rise,and finally close to the initial endowment.According the results of simulation,this thesis designs two incentive mechanisms.One is from the perspective of government,it can through the formulation “repeatable negotiated agreement” to prompt generic technology R&D of enterprise.The other is from the perspective of enterprise,under the cooperation models and distribution methods are not sure,the best choose for enterprise is combine according to the investment proportion distribution with centralizing R&D alliance group structure.The innovation point of this thesis is to apply the evolutionary game of public goods to analysis the impact of alliance group structure on the investment level of enterprise generic technology R&D;not only from the perspective of government subsides,but also from the alliance group structure selection,design incentive mechanism to enhance the supply level of generic technology.