Font Size: a A A

Study On Formation Mechanism Of Generic Technology Cooperative R&D Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

Posted on:2016-09-16Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y L ZhengFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330479985485Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the advent of the era of knowledge economy and Innovation 2.0, technology innovation has become the main motors of the national and regional economic growth, and become the important source of maintaining sustainable competitive advantage for enterprises. Economic Globalization makes each country and area gradually blend into the global production networks, the consumer demand and the market environment enterprises faced is also more complex, technology R&D which enterprises only rely on their own resources have been unable to meet the needs of their survival and development, and so cooperative R&D, for which the phenomena of industrial clusters in regional provides convenience, has become an important option for the enterprises. As the augmentation of the complement each other of technology innovation and the economic, the competition of industry or enterprises has evolved from the technology of the market stage gradually into generic technology. In the critical period of Chinese economic development mode transition, upgrading traditional industry and cultivating strategic emerging industry puts forward the urge for generic technology R&D. however, The problems,such as the lack for industrial generic technology innovators and the unclear orientation of the government, still are the key to restricting our industry technology upgrading.So far, the industrial generic technology supply mode in China mainly includes the supply mode of the government leading and Industry-University-Research cooperative R&D. However, the generic technology supply form of joint R&D with enterprise as the main body is few in practice. In academics, it mostly stays in the theory discussion and a few case studies, few scholars specialized researches the generic technology supply mode by cooperative R&D between enterprises, and it is rarer to examine their micro behavior. However, the enterprise which is closer to the market has a deeper understanding on the generic technology demand, the generic technology supply mode of enterprise as the main body of R&D, which can become a important supplement of the existing model, should be given due attention and clearly has strong theoretical and practical significance.This paper, which rests on evolutionary game theory, researches the formation mechanism of generic technology cooperative R&D establishing enterprises as the main R&D status in order to improve the status quo of generic technology supply failure. For this purpose, based on the investigation and review of the realistic background and literature, we determine the research topic that is the formation mechanism of generic technology cooperative R&D and accordingly we define the related concepts and problems. Then, this paper studies systematically on the formation mechanism of generic technology cooperative R&D climate and enterprise cooperative R&D issues in two well-matched companies in strength and strength of different ones using synthetically evolutionary game, mathematical deduction and numerical simulation. Further by implementing the improvement of the existing N-person evolutionary snowdrift game model, and using it to study on formation mechanism of generic technology cooperative R&D, which will become a new analysis tool for multiple enterprise generic technology cooperative R&D. Finally, combining case analysis at home and abroad, this paper puts forward the concept model of generic technology cooperative R&D formation mechanism and its facilitative strategies. This paper makes up for the drawback of paying less attention on the existing literature on the generic technology supply mode with enterprise as the main R&D body.The main research work done and the main conclusions obtained are that as follows:Firstly, this paper clearly defines the connotation of the generic technology, generic technology cooperative R&D innovators and their cooperation scope, and analyzes the applicability of using evolutionary game theory to generic technology cooperative R&D from generic technology cooperative R&D formation process, evolutionary game theory itself and its existing application in cooperation field and so on. These above are foundational research work.Secondly, this paper analyzes the formation mechanism of generic technology cooperative R&D climate based on the reciprocity theory. Accordingly, generic technology cooperative R&D game models, under the direct and indirect reciprocity mechanism, are constructed and the conclusion obtained as follows: the profit and loss parameters(e.g. information cost) are a basic starting point to create a good generic technology cooperative R&D climate, the formation of generic technology cooperative R&D climate is in essence the sustained and steady of cooperation behavior——the problem of the effective cooperative R&D mechanism formation.Thirdly, the formation mechanism of enterprise generic technology cooperative R&D in two well-matched companies in strength and strength of different ones is studied systematically and some conclusions obtained as follows: ①Information cost is a very important parameter for the formation of generic technology cooperative R&D mechanism, small enough information cost is a basic safeguard to make cooperative R&D mechanism form under whatever situation. ②The support of the government and University-Research plays a positive role in the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism, and relatively funds support speaking, the support for generic technology itself will play a more important role. ③As urgency for generic technology gets greater, business choose cooperative R&D strategy more likely. If the generic technology requirement is different for game sides, the greater the gap of urgency between both sides is, the less conducive the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism is. ④The higher the success rate of generic technology cooperative R&D is, the more favorable for the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism is. If the R&D strength of game sides is different, with given the R&D strength of stronger game side, the greater the gap of strength between sides is, the less favorable for the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism is. ⑤The difficulty of generic technology which is imitated and copied by enterprises has favorable for the alternative of cooperative R&D strategy. As a consequence, the greater the difficulty is, the more favorable for the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism is.Fourthly, a new N-person snowdrift game model is built by incorporating time parameter into the existing model, and the new model(GNSG) is successfully applied to research multiple enterprise generic technology cooperative R&D and some conclusions obtained as follows: the possibilities of the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism increases with increasing group size and decreasing benefit-to-cost ratio. The existence of a minimum threshold M>1 of enterprises provides a completely new U-style evolutionary dynamics. External supports and the difficulty of generic technology which is imitated and copied have great influence on the evolution of cooperative R&D system, The evolution trajectory of system gradually evolves from U-style to L-style with these parameters increasing, as a consequence, the attracting basin scale of stable equilibrium increases, and thus the possibility of the formation of cooperative R&D mechanism also increase.Fifthly, this paper integrally integrates the research results and puts forward the conceptual model of enterprise generic technology cooperative R&D formation mechanism. Combining case analysis at home and abroad, we put forward five strategies as follows: constructing the innovation platform, setting up special R&D plan of generic technology, playing a role of the government support continually, building generic technology intellectual property system and efficient organization operating mechanism, in order to promote the formation of generic technology cooperative R&D mechanism. Finally, this paper verifies the rationality of the conceptual model and strategies proposed through the case studies of Zhejiang Shaoxing textile industry.
Keywords/Search Tags:generic technology, cooperative R&D, formation mechanism, Snowdrift game, evolutionary game theory
PDF Full Text Request
Related items