Research On Government Subsidy For Generic Technology R&D Of Complex Equipment

The common technology of complex equipment is an important embodiment of the development level of a country's high and new technology.The complex equipment industry is the backbone of a country's manufacturing industry.Complex equipment is the game's weight for the world's major countries.The development of complex equipment industry can promote the leap-forward development of China's manufacturing industry,and the enhancement of common equipment R&D for complex equipment has been promoted to the country's strategic height.Due to the characteristics of spillover and high risks,the common technology of complex equipment is likely to cause market failures and Organizational failures,and enterprises in the complex equipment industry,especially emerging companies,are reluctant to research and develop,“hitch-hitch” and other phenomena.In order to promote the research and development of common technologies for complex equipment,government intervention is necessary.However,how the government intervenes and the intervention efforts are worth exploring.This paper first established an evolutionary game model between governments and enterprises of different scales in the complex equipment industry,and analyzed the dynamic evolution path of emerging enterprises,mature enterprises in government and complex equipment industries in the government and complex equipment industry,and the final trend of the entire game system.In a stable state.It focuses on the influence of government subsidies with different strengths on the evolution process and system results of both sides of the game.In addition,numerical simulations are conducted to obtain government subsidies that are conducive to the research and development of complex equipment common technologies in emerging equipment and mature enterprises within a certain scope.Too few subsidies cannot provide incentives to enterprises in the complex equipment industry.There are crowding-out effects on corporate investment in the complex equipment industry,both of which are not conducive to the R&D of complex equipment common technologies;due to the unique characteristics of the complex equipment common technology and the disparity in the strength of emerging and mature companies in the complex equipment industry The government subsidies have different effects on subsidizing enterprises of different sizes in the complex equipment industry.Then,a non-cooperative game and cooperative game based on emerging and mature enterprises in the complex equipment industry were further established,and the discussion on the common technology research and development system for complex equipment under the three conditions of Nash game,Steinberg game and cooperative game was discussed.The optimal government subsidy program for emerging and mature companies provides a basis for government subsidy for the research and development of complex equipment and common technology,allowing the government to fully leverage its funding,rationally allocate resources,and avoid “free riders” in the research and development of common technologies for complex equipment."phenomenon.Finally,based on the above research conclusions,a series of government subsidy policies concerning the research and development of the common technology of complex equipment are proposed to promote the research and development of common technologies for complex equipment,increase the research and development achievements of the common technologies of complex equipment,and realize the expansion of the complex equipment industry.