Research On Autonomous Supply Of Rural Public Goods Based On Reputation Mechanism

Since the reform and opening up,China’s economy has made considerable progress,and the people’s material living standards and social and economic development levels have greatly improved,but the imbalance between urban and rural development has become the main contradiction restricting economic development.The "Village Revitalization Strategy" put forward by the 19 th National Congress highlights the importance of the state attaches to the development of the rural economy.For a long time,rural public goods in China have been in a state of insufficient supply due to unreasonable structure,which has become a major factor restricting the development of China’s rural economy.Therefore,it is imperative to solve the problem of the supply of rural public goods.The traditional theory of welfare economics believes that public goods can only be supplied by the government to achieve the Pareto optimal state.With the development of social economy and institutional innovation,more and more private forces are involved in the supply of public goods.Coupled with China’s unique "acquaintance society" network,the independent supply of rural public goods has become possible in China.According to the theory of modern human resources leadership found that leadership by example,as an special class in the countryside,play an important role in promoting the independent supply of rural public goods.This thesis discusses the economic development and rural public goods of the village in Wangchenggong Village,Tai’an City,Shandong Province.Based on the leadership theory,using evolutionary game theory and complex network theory to establish theoretical models and computer simulation models to study the role of leadership by example in the independent supply of rural public goods.And through the analysis of the data to find the optimal range of influence and the optimal proportion of the leadership by example.Based on the analysis of the case and the analysis of the experimental data,the corresponding opinions on the autonomous supply of rural public goods in China are put forward.