Government-enterprise Collusion And Prevention Mechanism Design In China's Food Safety Supervision

Food safety is about people's livelihood.The security of food is the strategic goal of every country.Establishing a clear and efficient supervision system is the basis of food safety.In recent years,food safety accidents in China have been repeatedly banned,exposing the problems in China's food safety supervision.China's food safety supervision is jointly implemented by the central commission,and local governments shoulder the important responsibilities of managers.In "GDP" as the main officials of the performance appraisal and assessment index and the effect of fiscal decentralization,local governments often conspired with food enterprise,into some sort of ‘interests',indulge in the jurisdiction of the food industry use ‘low cost' the production mode of production,or directly to help food enterprises evade regulation.Because of the asymmetry of information,it is difficult for the central government to observe the real production cost of food enterprises,and it is difficult to effectively prevent the collusion behavior of government enterprises in time.In fact,from the food safety accident exposed by the media,it is found that the collusion of government enterprises is the important cause of the failure of food safety supervision.Therefore,it is necessary to make a deep analysis of the collusion behaviors in the food safety supervision system in China.In view of this,based on the characteristics of China's food safety regulatory model as the breakthrough point,first of all,food safety regulation in the cause of the collusion between local governments and food companies were analyzed,and the conspiracy of government and enterprises and on the basis of the study constraints;And then in ‘the central government,local government,food enterprise' three-tier principal-agent framework,the introduction of the media involved in food safety supervision game,through the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint,and then meet the optimal equilibrium solution on how to protect the contract.The research shows that in the optimal prevention of collusion,reducing the transaction cost of media participation in the investigation of accidents can improve the efficiency of media supervision.Food enterprises to choose between different mode of production in the rent,the greater the impact on the local government revenue sharing,the central government for the less tax,after the accident the central government to implement the heavier punishment is;And the higher the status of the media,the less likely it is to be captured by local governments,and the more adverse the local government will be,the better the prevention of conspiring contracts will be.At the same time,in the comparative static analysis,we also found that the central government will choose to prevent the contract of collusion when the social costs caused by food safety accidents are greater than that of rent-seeking.The more frequent the accident rate of food safety,the more the central government attaches importance to the prevention of collusion.Finally,in combination with the most typical cases of political enterprises in food safety supervision,the concrete measures to prevent collusion are put forward.