Study On The Problems Of China’s Food Safety Regulation Under The Disturbance From Local Government

Recently food security situation is worrying in China. It is urgent to change China’s food security situation, and improve regulation performance of food safety, and achieve transformation from the low efficiency to high efficiency of the state.Causes of complex matters are complex, multi-dimensional. Scholars around the world have studied on the internal mechanism of food safety issues from different angles. Scholars’ perspectives focus on product features, industry characteristics, the coupling between industrial organizations, the main factors impacting on consumers, design defects of food safety regulation system. In short, most researches have focused on food, food industry, regulation system itself.China’s food safety accidents outbreak constantly, problems of food safety have shown new features, especially big enterprises become protagonists of China’s food safety accidents. This kind of phenomenon operates against economics common sense. Though many reforms have been made in food safety regulation field after food safety accidents, such as establishing the national food safety committee, carrying out the administration accountability system, issuing the Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, formulating new food safety standards, implementing food recall system etc, food safety incidents happen constantly. It seems that adjustment of food safety regulation affects nothing. Therefore, we must study the problems of China’s food safety regulation from a broader perspective.China’s food safety regulations happen in the process of reform of China’s fundamental political system, economic systems, such as the establishment and improvement of market mechanisms. These deep-seated reforms must affect China’s food safety regulations. Only from the perspective of a large institutional environment, can we detect the nature of the problem of food safety..After fiscal decentralization reforms in 1994, central government delegate powers to the local government, such as personnel rights, property rights and legal rights to the local government. As the policy-makers, policy implementers, the local government’s political goals, economic goals must have a profound impact on activities happening in the region. In fact, in the context of fiscal decentralization, local government’s role has evolving from manager of the public affairs to the "local government corporation". The competition between local governments has distorted China’System environment. Basing on the perspective of local government disturbances, this article analysis the deep reasons for problems of china’food safety regulation, and appropriate policy measures. Structural framework of this paper is as follows.The first chapter is introduction. In recent years, incidences of food safety happen frequently. China’s food safety problems have also shown a series of new features, such as characters have evolved from the small workshop, small business into large, well-known enterprises; It has become the industry unwritten rules. It has extended from non-essentials to essentials. It has hit the bottom line which consumer can tolerate. It has had a bad effect on all economic participants. We must immediately deal with food safety issues.The second chapter is a comment on researches of government regulation of food safety. This paper summarizes the researches from two angles. Firstly, it summarizes the theory why must carry out government regulation and improve its performance. Because asymmetry information, externality, government regulation must be introduced. Due to the high cost of regulation, regulation capture, government regulation fails too. Meanwhile regulation system itself has the life cycle; therefore, improvement of government regulation quality also is an eternal topic. Then this paper summarizes the researches of government food safety regulation performance. Current food safety regulation performance researches have focused on the following aspects:whether or not the government’s food safety regulation could have good effect, why the government food safety regulation cannot obtain good effect? Scholars analyze the reasons from the different angles, such as defects of government regulation system, the constraint conditions of food safety regulation, stage characteristics of industry development stage, and so on. Few scholars study it from the perspective of local government. Considering the uniqueness of China’ food safety regulation, this paper analyzes it from the angle of local government.The third chapter is the theoretical framework of food safety regulation research which bases on the perspective of local government. Focusing on the main line of the local government, this paper analyzes how the local government affects the performance of food safety regulation, from the angles of common problems of the principal-agent, problems of collusion, from the tripartite game balance structure of capital, consumers, the government, from the relevance of the local government food safety regulation and different enterprise scale structure, from the interaction between market governance mechanism and administrative management mechanism.The fourth chapter includes the contents of Chinese food safety regulation evolution, defect and the cause of formation of the defects. This paper tries to find out the root of defects of Chinese food safety regulation from the angle of local government. Institutional change has path dependence. To analysis the food safety regulation problem, we should verify their source; we must make clear the changes process of Chins’food safety regulation institution. Firstly this paper describes China’s food safety supervision system, and points out the defects of food safety regulation, and analyzes the causes of them. Under the background of fiscal decentralization conspiracy between the government and enterprise regulated is the key reason for defects of food safety regulation. Because of the unbalanced game structure of capital, consumer and government, it becomes difficult to remedy defects of food safety regulation in time. The realistic situation for food safety regulation provides excuses for defects of food safety regulation, such as incentive incompatibilities, incomplete food safety standards, and laggard equipment. The "economic man" nature of the local government causes the local government relaxes supervision on any type of enterprises. Lacking of double governance mechanism leads to food safety regulation in low efficiency trap.The fifth chapter is policy Suggestions to upgrade local government food safety regulation performance. Low efficiency in local government regulation causes the Chinese worrying food safety conditions. The focus of this paper is whether it can be realized that the state of China’s food safety shift from low efficiency to high efficiency. This paper demonstrates the possibility of this transformation from two angles. Firstly, from the general rule of institutional change, as long as the system is open, rational "economic man" is object to pursuit system optimization, the competition between different interest groups would make the social system toward the efficient state. Unfortunately, this time span will be longer, it may be in the death of a privilege class and industrial development damaged for cost. Open system environment and the introduction of external variable are avail ways to untie system "locked" state. Secondly, the paper constructs a model, the analysis results show that the China’food safety regulation have the possibility to shifting from low efficiency to high efficiency. System itself has no efficiency, whether the system can promote the efficiency of system depends on its adaptation to the organization. Therefore, system design should meet certain requirements to realize our country’s food safety status’shifting from low efficiency to high efficiency. Food safety regulation system design should meet the following principles:the system of scientific configuration, system inside with ideology construction design should be combined, system design, enhance varies to also describe with self-owned institutional environment of the correspondence, establish a social error correction mechanism to ensure the initial system design, the benign system dependent. According to conspiracy between government and enterprises regulated, the paper suggests some measures. Firstly, we should adjust performance evaluation indicator system and structure, Increase Contribution of food safety regulation performance, adjust the incentive direction of the central government to the local government officials, enhance local government’ enthusiasm to food safety regulation to improve local government food safety regulation efficiency. Moreover, we should adjust the incentive way, and change the food safety information transfer mode. Moreover, we should reduce regulation Judgment permissions, Local food safety regulatory organizations should also make corresponding adjustment; finally, we should cultivate market management mechanism.This paper has three innovations. Firstly, governments are often considered as a unity in previous food safety regulation study, and few people distinguish differences between the central government and the local government in the process of food safety management. In fact, under the ground of fiscal decentralization system, local governments often distort macroeconomic measures in order to pursue the local interests, and result central government regulation to fail. This paper distinguishes the differences between the central government and local government, explore China’ food safety regulation inefficient reasons from the perspective of local government. Secondly, enterprises are often considered as a whole in previous studies, few people distinguish the scale of enterprise. In fact, different scale enterprises product unsafe food with different internal mechanism and system root. This paper constructs two groups of game model, one is about food safety regulatory organization and small-scale food production enterprise, the other is about food safety regulatory organization and large-scale food production enterprise. Through the game model, the paper clarify that why the different scale enterprises all product unsafe food. Secondly, the information is asymmetry and interests are incompatible are the main causes of the conspiracy. Reducing information asymmetry state is the key to solve the government to conspiracy. At present, the food safety information transfer is self- closed. The administration accountability system is a kind of punishment afterwards aiming at negligence of food safety regulation. In order to avoid punishment, local government and enterprise must form an alliance to blockade unsafe food information. If the central government implement positive incentives to the local government food safety regulation, the conspiracy between local government and enterprises can be destroyed, thus open information transmission mechanism can be formed. At the same time, the incentive measures are passed down gradually, which ultimately lead farmers to product safe food in source of food production.