The Influence Of General Manager Independence Degree Heterogeneity Investment Efficiency

Investment decision-making is the starting point of corporate financial decision-making,but also the cornerstone of the company's business performance,in the financial management plays a decisive role.Investment decisions have a direct impact on the company's financing decisions and dividend policy.Good investment decisions are decisive for the sustainability of the going-concern assumption.As a senior executive of corporate governance and investment decision-making,the impact of the general manager's behavior on investment efficiency is obvious.As the centralized equity structure becomes a universal and stable corporate governance structure,major shareholders use their control power for personal gain and infringe upon the minority shareholders Interest,the emptiness of the same line will interfere with the efficiency of investment in enterprises,and different generation path of the general manager of the hollowing out of major shareholders will make the business investment efficiency has changed.How the degree of independence between the general manager and the major shareholder affects the investment efficiency has rarely been studied in the existing literature.Based on the analysis of heterogeneity of general manager degree of independence,this paper chooses the A shares of all the listed companies in 2013-2015 as the research sample,and divides the general manager into consistent,dependent and independent types according to degree of independence,Influence,on the basis of which,we add the regulatory variables: the remuneration level and ownership concentration of the general manager,and explore the regulatory effect on the relationship between the general manager's heterogeneity and the investment efficiency.The findings show that the independence of the general manager is positively related to the efficiency of the enterprise investment.When the remuneration level of the general manager increases,the restraining effect of the consistent general manager on the investment efficiency is weakened,the promotion effect of the reliance manager on the investment efficiency is strengthened,The manager's role in promoting the investment efficiency is diminished.When the ownership concentration is intensified,the positive correlation between the independence of the general manager and the investment efficiency of enterprises is weakened,while the independence of the general manager is not interfered with the investment efficiency.In view of the conclusion of empirical research,this paper will give suggestions on how to improve the investment efficiency of listed companies in terms of the selection of corporate governance executives,the motivation of the general manager and the optimization of the ownership structure.(1)The employment of the need to fully consider the importance of independence,in addition to the background of the general manager,its source that is,the relationship with the major shareholders should also be given enough attention,the selection of listed companies should be inclined to choose a high degree of professional managers.(2)To optimize the ownership structure of the enterprise and fully enhance the enthusiasm of the general manager.In the general manager of the degree of independence is not high,the high degree of ownership concentration is not conducive to the long-term interests of enterprises,as the convergence of the interests of general managers and major shareholders,the concentration of equity makes corporate investment behavior oversight,therefore,the source of independence Relatively low general manager of the enterprise,the relatively decentralized allocation of shares can be checked by major shareholders for personal benefit to control the business investment behavior,so that the value of enterprises with higher protection.(3)In order to motivate the general manager's enthusiasm,it is necessary to rationally design the general manager's salary level.Reasonably based on the higher remuneration incentive will rely on the major shareholders or their own interests and common interests of the general manager of the enthusiasm to make it more effectively participate in business management and enhance the overall performance of the company;for professional managers,companies should develop in addition to raising wages More comprehensive incentives to maintain their enthusiasm and energy to create greater value for the enterprise.Academia has conducted extensive research on the investment behavior of listed companies,but there are few studies on the influence of general manager on shareholder independence,especially from the perspective of heterogeneity.Based on the heterogeneity of managers' independent degree,this paper studies the influence of different types of managers on the investment efficiency of listed companies,hoping to enrich the research in this field and provide reference for future research.