Research On Evolution Mechanism Of Internet Public Opinion Under Media Participation Based On Game Theory

With the development of Internet technology and network communication technology,online communities such as Weibo and Wechat have become important platforms for people to share their lives,express their views,and provide opinions.Although the development of science and technology has accelerated the speed of information dissemination,expanded the scope of information dissemination,and provided convenient channels for information acquisition,it has also made it easier for Internet public opinion to erupt and increase the frequency of public opinion.When web platform users publish blog posts or news on Weibo or WeChat friends,they often forward and share the number of posts by other users.Therefore,how to correctly monitor and control the public opinion of the Internet becomes the government's health network.The important issue of the environment.This article assumes that the online media will participate in the reporting of public opinion events.The cyber media's strategic space is(comprehensive reporting,one-sided reporting),and the establishment of two types of game models for the media and government,netizens,and opinion leaders.The fairness factor income function is introduced into the game gain matrix,and the forward induction method is used to establish a three-stage dynamic game.The specific conditions for the media and opinion leaders to choose the non-subgame perfect equilibrium path are analyzed,and the rate of return change ? is derived.Threshold.Subsequently,an evolutionary game model between online media and opinion leaders,netizens and netizens was established.It was concluded that when the government's penalty for one-sided coverage of online media is greater than zero,and the net income of opinion leaders is greater than zero,ESS is(1,1).The evolution result is(comprehensive reporting,forwarding);when the government's punishment for network media one-sided reporting is greater than zero,the opinion leader's forward net return is less than zero,and the forwarding return is less than cost,ESS is(1,0)and the evolution result is(Full coverage,not forwarding);when the government's punishment for one-sided reports of online media is greater than zero,the net income of opinion leader's forwarding strategy is less than zero,and the return on transmission is greater than the cost,ESS is(1,1),and the evolution result is(full coverage,Forwarding).In the same way,the evolutionary stability strategy under different conditions in the evolutionary game model of netizens and net folks is drawn.For the above model,the Matlab software was used to simulate the evolutionary game model of online media and opinion leader netizens and net folks.According to the conditions of different evolutionary results,the parameters were simulated and the simulation results of different systems were obtained.This verifies the correctness of the model and reveals the new factors that influence the outbreak of online public opinion in the online media from another perspective,and provides new ideas and new perspectives for the management department to supervise or groom the Internet public opinion.