Research On Evasion Of Moral Hazard In Third Sector Education Evaluation Under The Perspective Of Incentive Compatibility

Since the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist sector of China on theReform of the Education System" in 1985,it has been proposed to evaluate higher education.China's higher education evaluation has gone from the government-led assessment to the multi-assessment of government-led,encouraging social participation,and the evolution of multi-assessment led by society today.The government's power is continuously decentralized,the autonomy of universities is gradually expanding,and the social third-sector forces are increasing.especially after the establishment of the separation system for management and evaluation,the government no longer directly participates in educational evaluation,which largely avoids the risk of government power monopoly,but the separation of management evaluation does not mean the elimination of moral hazard.After the separation of the management,the government commissioned a third sector to conduct an educational evaluation.The government and the third sector formed a principal-agent relationship.The government became the regulator of higher education evaluation,the third-sector evaluation organization became the direct implementer of the evaluation,the university is the object of evaluation.The three together complete the assessment task,but at the same time,the three are relatively independent individuals,each with their own different interests,and the conflicts and incompatibilities between the interests may cause one or both parties to pursue their own benefits and harm the interests of other parties,lead to moral hazard behavior.Some scandals in the evaluation of higher education on the internet,including money rights transactions,bargaining,and collusion,all of these indicate that moral hazard in social third-sector assessment remains presence.Therefore,this paper takes "incentive compatibility" as the starting point,analyze the incompatibility between the government,universities,and third-sector assessment organizations in the third-sector-led assessment,and the moral hazard problems arising from them,and intention to explore the mechanisms and countermeasures of incentive compatibility,and effectively evade moral hazard.First of all,based on the analysis of relevant theoretical results at home and abroad,this paper introduces the moral hazard problems in the third-sector education evaluation of the main problems to be analyzed in this paper and the main theoretical basis of incentive compatibility theory.Secondly,it sorts out the evolution process of China's higher education evaluation policy.On this basis,it uses the incentive compatibility theory to analyze the conflicts of interest between government,colleges and social third parties at different stages and the moral hazard problems that may arise.Analyze the content.Finally,guided by theory,from the perspective of the compatibility of government,universities and third-sector evaluation organizations,the strategy of avoiding moral hazard is proposed,including the macro incentive compatibility concept and the micro-incentive compatibility evaluation system.