Research On Avoidance Of The Moral Hazard In The Third-sector Education Evaluation

With the detachment reform of supervision,running and evaluation,evaluation has changed from authorized mode to commissioned mode,in which the third sectors will undertake evaluation tasks as the agent.However,there will be moral hazard of the third sectors due to principal-agent relationship,which will damage the fairness and justice of educational evaluation,the benign governance of higher education,and the public interest.Therefore,avoiding the moral hazard of the third sectors has become a problem that cannot be ignored.On the basis of looking forward to this issue,this study is the prospective answer.It is important to propose that relational contracts should be used to avoid the moral hazard of the third sectors,which is the main difference between this study and the previous.On the basis of Relational Contract Theory,this study mainly analyzes the moral hazard of“rent-seeking ” and “inaction” in the third-sector education evaluation,it explores the subjective and objective causes of the moral hazard from the perspective of relational contract,analyzes the mechanism of relational contract to avoid the third sector’s moral hazard from a theoretical level.This study uses statistical analysis and literature analysis to conduct an empirical study on the mechanism of relationship contracts to avoid the moral hazard of the third-sector education evaluation.The frequency of the evaluation results provided by the third sectors selected and used by universities is taken as a measure of the degree of trust and reputation of the third sectors.The degree of information disclosure of third-sector evaluation results and the efforts of the third sectors is taken as the indicators to measure moral hazard avoidance behaviors,the impact of the former on the latter is analyzed.The results of the study show that relational contract can effectively avoid the moral hazard of the third-sector education evaluation,but the long-term benefits obtained through the performance of the relational contract are greater than the short-term benefits obtained through the moral hazard behaviors,which is the condition for the relational contract to avoid the moral hazard of the third-sector education evaluation.Combining theoretical analysis and empirical research,the most important conclusion obtained in this study is that the starting point for avoiding the moral hazard of third-sector education evaluation from the perspective of relational contract is that it is necessary to makethe reputation gains of the third sectors significantly larger than the short-term gains obtained through moral hazard behaviors.Therefore,this study proposes that the trust incentive mechanism for the third sectors should be constructed by establishing the principal-agent relationship between the government and third-party institutions,forming long-term incentives for the third sectors,and providing reasonable communication channels for the third sectors and reputation effect should be formed by fostering the third sectors with multiple competitions,conducting performance evaluation on the third sectors,and establishing a evaluation reputation communication platform,so as to restrain and motivate the third sectors actively execute relational contract and avoid moral hazard.