Research On Two-stage Incentive Models For Medical Knowledge Providers Based On Health Data Bank

In recent years,with the deepening of medical information construction,health care big data has developed rapidly.As a medical service organization for health care big data management,health data bank has become a hot topic in academic and industrial areas at home and abroad.However,at present,the enthusiasm of medical knowledge holders is low,which directly affects the ability of specialist teams in health data bank to generate medical knowledge.Therefore,based on principal-agent theory,consider the business objectives of growth and maturity stages of health data bank,and study how to promote incentives for doctors and medical institutions to provide high-quality medical knowledge and medical knowledge data for health data bank in the medical service supply chain.The research content is as follows:(1)Considering the growth period of health data bank,a short-term incentive strategy is designed to encourage doctors and medical institutions to provide high-quality medical knowledge and medical knowledge data to enrich the database of health data bank.According to the case whether there are information symmetries between health data bank and the doctor and medical institution,incentive models of four situations are constructed respectively,the optimal solutions of each model are compared and numerical examples are used to analyze the influence of parameters on incentive effect.It is found that with the goal of optimal medical knowledge,medical knowledge data and the utility of health data bank,it is the optimal case where doctor and medical institution are both information symmetric with health data bank,but it's not always the worst case where the two are both information asymmetrical with health data bank which should adjust the incentive strategies for the doctor and medical institution with different parameters based on the specific information symmetry situation.(2)Considering the maturity period of health data bank,a long-term incentive strategy is designed to encourage doctors and medical institutions to provide medical knowledge and medical knowledge data with high contribution to the medical service plan that clients need.According to the case there are information symmetries between health data bank and doctors and medical institutions,incentive models of four situations are constructed respectively,the optimal solutions of each model are compared and numerical examples are used to analyze the influence of parameters on incentive effect.It is found that health data bank should actively promote information symmetry with doctors and medical institutions at the same time.When it is not possible,it should select whether to achieve information asymmetry with them and adjust the proportion of incentives according to various parameters.Clients should participate in the process of health data bank setting up incentives to ensure the contribution of health data bank to the final plan and improve the accuracy of the final plan evaluation system.(3)The incentive effects of long-term incentive strategy and short-term incentive strategy in different cases where there are different information symmetry situations between health data bank and doctor and medical institution are compared and analyzed through numerical simulation.It is found that health data bank is more willing to implement long-term incentive strategy.However,as long as one of the doctor and medical institution is information asymmetrical with health data bank,the doctor and medical institution may not be willing to cooperate with the long-term incentive strategy.The research results of this thesis can enrich the motivation theories of health data bank and medical service supply chain,and provide decision support for health data banks,which has certain theoretical and practical significance.