Research On Shareholder Game Of Railway Enterprise Mixed Reform Fund Based On System Dynamics

The fund for mixed ownership reform of railway enterprises is an idea put forward by the Railway Corporation to promote the reform of mixed ownership system in the railway industry.The necessary condition for the establishment of the fund for mixed reform of railway enterprises is that different interest subjects can achieve good cooperation.The state-owned capital represented by the railway sector has security requirements,and the social capital has high income requirements.Therefore,in the process of fund-raising,it needs to meet the needs of investors with different risk preferences.In this paper,the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the game between the shareholders of the mixed funds of railway enterprises.At the same time,combined with the system dynamics simulation method,the game process is simulated to study the path of the state-owned capital and social capital represented by the railway sector to build a win-win mechanism of cooperation.The main work of this paper is as follows:In the study of the game between state-owned capital and social capital represented by the railway sector,firstly,according to the investment preference and goal pursuit of the financing subject of the mixed reform fund of the railway enterprises,based on the assumption of the limited rationality of the railway sector and social capital,the evolutionary game model of the railway sector social capital cooperation is established This paper analyzes the possible strategy choices of the participants,determines the external variables that affect the strategy choices,and analyzes the changing trend of the partic ipants' strategy choices by using the widely used replicator dynamic equation.On this basis,the system dynamics model is established,and the external variables that affect the choice of railway sector and social capital strategy are assigned in a reasonable range.The game process is simulated by Vensim simulation software,and the sensitivity of external variables is analyzed.The simulation results show that only when the railway sector provides incentives,social capital can provide public goods,and the initial strategy choice of both parties to a large extent affects the final game equilibrium.The residual control right has certain attraction for social capital to participate in the cooperation,and improving the proportion of social capital's equity can improve its cooperation probability.Secondly,according to the replicator dynamic equation,the system equilibrium point of evolutionary game is solved,and the stability of equilibrium point of game is analyzed theoretically by using linear analysis methods such as Jacobin matrix.In addition,we use Vensim software to demonstrate and test the model,simulate the "mutation"situation at the equilibrium point of the game,and verify the stability of the equilibrium point.The analysis shows that under the static incentive cooperation strategy,the pure strategy equilibrium point of evolutionary game is stable,while the hybrid game equilibrium point is not;when the "dynamic compensation" mechanism is introduced,the pure strategy equilibrium point is still stable,and the hybrid strategy equilibrium point is not stable.However,if the railway sector sponsors shareholders to provide a large degree of incentive measures,the equilibrium point of the hybrid strategy of evolutionary game is also stable.Although the revenue of the railway sector will be affected in the short term when providing incentive measures,in the long term,the establishment of the mixed reform fund of railway enterprises can improve the overall revenue of both parties involved and promote the reform process of the railway industry,so it is meaningful for the railway sector to provide incentive measures.Finally,based on the simulation results,suggestions are put forward to establish a win-win mechanism to maintain stable partnership among different investors of the railway mixed reform fund.