Study On Quality Behavior Of General Contractor In "BOT+EPC" Expressway Project

With the deepening of economic system reform,China's highway construction has gradually turned to the direction of diversification of investment subjects and channels.As a new way of financing and construction,BOT + EPC model can meet the basic needs of social capital while achieving social benefits,and is favored by the government and social capital."BOT + EPC" mode is one of the typical manifestations of PPP mode.In recent years,the state has issued a series of policies to hope that PPP projects will change from high-speed development to high-quality development,which puts forward higher requirements for the quality of "BOT + EPC" projects.In the "BOT+EPC" expressway construction project,the identity and income structure of the general contractor is complex,and the interest demands are multi-faceted.As the direct implementer of the expressway project,the general contractor's efforts in quality behavior have a great impact on the quality of the expressway entity and operation efficiency.Based on the important characteristics of the quality behavior of the general contractor,this paper firstly analyses the influencing factors of the quality behavior from both internal and external aspects,and qualitatively compares the transformation and difference between the "BOT + EPC" model and the traditional EPC model of the general contractor's quality behavior.Based on the risk of alienation of quality behavior choice of general contractor under the principal-agent relationship,the necessity of quality behavior incentive for general contractor of "BOT+EPC" expressway project is discussed,and the methods of improving quality behavior effort level of general contractor are studied from two aspects of explicit incentive and implicit incentive.In the aspect of explicit incentive,based on the principal-agent relationship between the project company and the general contractor,combined with the income structure of the dual identity of the general contractor,and considering the influence of construction quality behavior on the revenue of the operation stage,this paper establishes the incentive model of the general contractor's quality behavior under the mode of "BOT+EPC".This paper theoretically analyses the influence of ownership ratio,discount coefficient,franchise period,maintenance cost coefficient and effort cost coefficient on the incentive level of investors and the quality behavior of general contractors,which provides a basis for project companies to choose incentive level and the quality behavior effort level of general contractors.On this basis,This paper further compares and analyses the solution results of the incentive model under the traditional mode,and get the conclusion that the quality behavior of the general contractor is better,the construction quality is better,and the incentive level of the project company can be reduced appropriately under the mode of "BOT+EPC".It explains the internal mechanism of the change of the quality behavior of the general contractor after the mode transformation from the quantitative level,and finds out the incentive strategy of the project company under the mode of "BOT + EPC".In the aspect of implicit incentive,introducing psychological thought,the quality behavior evaluation system of general contractor of "BOT+EPC" expressway project is established from four dimensions: basic quality capability,quality performance,quality relationship coordination and quality achievement.The weight is determined by subjective and objective weighting method of AHP-entropy weight method,and then the grey fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is carried out.Finally,this paper carries out case analysis on SJ branch line,verifies the relevant models and conclusions established in this paper,and provides a support basis for the health promotion of "BOT + EPC" model in the field of Expressway in China.