Research On Prevention Of Collusion Behavior In Government Procurement Under Principal-agent Model

In order to accelerate the government system reform program,improve people’s livelihood and promote infrastructure construction,in 2019,China’s government procurement began to deepen the reform of "deregulation service",reduce the access threshold,and let government procurement units have more autonomy.Under the principal-agent mode,the procurement cycle is low,the procurement quality is excellent,and the specialty is high,which meets the procurement requirements of government procurement units,making the number of government procurement units choosing the principal-agent procurement mode surge in recent years.With the popularization of principal-agent procurement,China’s market economy system is not perfect enough to provide space for rent-seeking behavior,and the problem of serious damage to the government’s interests caused by rent-seeking problem is becoming more and more serious.If rent-seeking behavior occurs in the principal-agent government procurement,it will cause losses to the interests of other economic subjects,especially the government owners and the state.It will have a huge impact on the relevant mechanisms of free and fair competition and the priority of the best,and will also have different degrees of adverse effects on the stable procurement environment in China.Based on the study of government procurement and rent-seeking behavior under the principal-agent model at home and abroad,this paper defines the relevant concepts of principal-agent model procurement,introduces rent-seeking theory,stakeholder theory and game theory;through literature statistics and the characteristics of principal-agent procurement,it identifies the various stakeholders in government procurement under the principal-agent model,as well as the rent-seeking body formed Type,then summed up the causes of rent-seeking and the manifestation of rent-seeking behavior.The rent-seeking body composed of purchasing agents,evaluation experts and suppliers’ actual implementers forms a game quartet with the government supervision agencies,constructs a dynamic game model of incomplete information,and studies the factors that reduce the behavior of rent-seeking body according to the results of the model;finally,discusses the rent-seeking prevention management in the process of purchasing from the perspective of the government from three aspects: punishment of stakeholders,government Supervision,qualification spot check of government procurement agency.From the perspective of purchasing agents,suppliers and evaluation experts,the measures to obtain benefits through compliance with procurement regulations and formal ways are as follows: the optimal principal-agent incentive contract and the establishment of a good social(people’s)public opinion environment.Most of the research on the rent-seeking behavior of government under the mode of entrustment is based on the discussion of purchasing units,purchasing agencies and other participants.In this paper,the rational economic "people" as the core,standing in the perspective of the government supervision department to discuss "people" in the principal-agent mode of procurement activities and rent-seeking demands.The purpose of this paper is to study the rent-seeking problems in the government procurement business under the principal-agent model based on the existing literature of rent-seeking in construction projects,promote the development and extension of the principal-agent model in the Chinese government procurement industry,improve the management level and work quality of government procurement,reduce the rent-seeking behavior of government procurement under the principal-agent model,and put forward preventive measures and suggestions.