Pricing Decisions In A Supply Chain With Manufacturers’ Fairness Concern And Carbon Emission Reduction

In recent years,environmental problems have become more and more serious.Therefore,various countries have introduced low-carbon emission reduction policies to cope with environmental changes,China has also enacted laws and regulations on carbon emission reduction.For enterprises,energy conservation and emission reduction is imperative.In previous supply chain studies,most scholars assume that the decisionmaker is rational,but in fact,the decision-maker will be affected by irrational factors.The decision-maker will pay attention to whether the profit distribution is fair or not,and such fairness concern behavior will affect the decision of participants.With the development of e-commerce,the power structure of the market has changed.In the past,manufacturers in the supply chain were often the dominant players and retailers were the followers.However,in the current e-commerce,the power of the retailers,especially the retail giants,gradually increased,and many retailers have become the dominant players in the supply chain.This paper studies the optimization of supply chain operation composed of two manufacturers and a single retailer,introducing fairness concerns and carbon emission reduction.Assumes that retailer is dominant,manufacturers are followers,two manufacturers compete against each other.In view of the three scenarios of non-carbon emission reduction of both manufacturers,carbon emission reduction of single manufacturer and carbon emission reduction of both manufacturers,two Stackelberg game models of fair neutral and fairness concern of single manufacturer were constructed respectively.By solving the model with the game method,the equilibrium solution are obtained,and the influence of manufacturers’ equity preference on the supply chain is analyzed.Relevant conclusions are verified by numerical simulation analysis.The main contents of this paper are as follows.In the supply chain in which neither manufacturer take measures to reduce emissions,the Stackelberg game models of the manufacturers’ fair neutral and manufacturer’s fairness concern model are constructed respectively,and the solution is solved by the reverse induction method.The optimal decisions under different fairness concerns are obtained and the relevant conclusions are obtained and verified by the numerical analysis method.In a supply chain with only one manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions,the Stackelberg game models of the manufacturers’ fair neutral,manufacturer 1’s fairness concern and manufacturer 2’s fairness concern,using backward induction solution,get different fairness concern situation decision-making strategy,relevant conclusions after comparative analysis,numerical analysis on these conclusions,further verify the conclusion.When both manufacturers take measures to reduce emissions,the manufacturers’ fair neutral Stackelberg game model and manufacturer’s fairness concern Stackelberg game model are constructed respectively,using backward induction solution and get the decision strategies under different situation,and make comparative analysis to obtain relevant conclusions,which are verified by numerical analysis method.In the case of manufacturers’ fair neutrality and fairness concern,the pricing strategy,carbon emission reduction level and profit of supply chain under three carbon emission reduction behaviors were compared,and relevant conclusions were obtained.Numerical analysis was used to verify the conclusions.The research shows that,under certain conditions,when the manufacturer has carbon emission reduction behavior and is concerned about fairness,it is most beneficial to the manufacturer;when only concerned about fairness,it is more advantageous;when only concerned about carbon emission reduction,it is more unfavorable;when not concerned about carbon emission reduction and is not concerned about fairness,it is most unfavorable.In the three cases of no carbon emission reduction by either manufacturer,no carbon emission reduction by a single manufacturer and no carbon emission reduction by both manufacturers,the more manufacturers with carbon emission reduction,the better for the retailer.