Decision And Coordination Of Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Fairness Concern Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

The emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide causes the temperature of the earth’s surface to rise,which can easily lead to extreme weather,sea level rise,and ecosystem collapse,so it is necessary to control carbon emissions in order to protect the environment and maintain ecological balance.The carbon cap-and-trade mechanism controls carbon dioxide emissions by regulating the carbon allowances received by enterprises and the price of carbon trading,thus reducing pollution and damage to the environment.The two channels of the dual-channel supply chain with the opening of online direct sales channel have different consumer shares,and in the process of carbon emission reduction bodies of supply chain not only have to pay the investment cost and operating cost of emission reduction,but also need to solve the conflict between the two channels,so the dual-channel supply chain is more complex than the single-channel supply chain.Fairness concerns emphasize that decision makers not only focus on their own interests in the decision-making process,but also make decisions with reference to the profit level of others,and then affect the overall profit of the supply chain system.Therefore,it is necessary to coordinate the low-carbon dual-channel supply chain considering fairness concerns under the carbon cap-and-trade policy.Based on this,this paper constructs a secondary dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,assuming that the manufacturer is the dominant player in the supply chain,and uses the Starkelberg games approach in the context of carbon cap-and-trade policy,and then discusses different scenarios of fair neutrality between the manufacturer and the retailer,unilateral fairness concern of the manufacturer or the retailer,and bidirectional fairness concern.Firstly,the influence of carbon-trade price,carbon quotas and consumer distribution ratio on carbon emission reduction,pricing and profit level under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making is explored.Then,the influence of fairness concern behavior on decision variables is studied through comparative analysis.Finally,the revenue sharing contract is designed for coordination,and Matlab is used for numerical simulation.The main results are as follows:(1)In the dual-channel supply chain,the higher the carbon-trade price and cross-price sensitivity coefficient are beneficial to motivate manufacturer to improve the carbon reduction rate;the wholesale price,offline and online channels’ prices all show a trend of increasing and then decreasing with the increase of carbon-trade price;carbon quotas given by the government to the manufacturer does not affect the retailer’s profit;the more the proportion of consumers in offline channel,the higher the retailer’s profit,but the manufacturer’s profit and the dual-channel supply chain’s profit decrease and then increase with the increase of the proportion of offline consumers.(2)Both the fairness concerns of the manufacturer and the retailer are detrimental to carbon emission reduction,and retailer’s fairness concern has a more significant impact on carbon emission reduction rate;the profits of manufacturer and supply chain are lowest when both parties are fair concern,and retailer’s profit is lowest when only manufacturer is fairness concern,fairness concern behavior eventually hurts the total profit of the supply chain system.(3)The Pareto improvement of the dual-channel supply chain can be achieved by designing a revenue sharing contract to adjust the retailer’s revenue retention ratio and wholesale price,and the intensity of fairness concern of supply chain members affects the parameters in the contract.(4)Wholesale price is positively correlated with the proportion of consumers in the offline channel when fairness is neutral,and changes negatively when both parties are fairness concern,but the proportion of consumers in the offline channel does not affect the proportion of retailer’s revenue retention.