Local Government's Behavior Of Land Supply And Allocation Of Different Land Resources

Under the current land system and fiscal taxation system in China,local governments are subject to the dual pressures of political performance considerations and fiscal revenue.In order to maximize local benefits,local governments have shown excessive supply of industrial land,tightened the supply of residential land and commercial land in the process of the allocation of land resources for different uses.This paper not only theoretically analyzes the logic of local government's land supply behavior and its impact on the allocation of land resources,but also uses the System GMM method to empirically test this impact mechanism through panel data at the provincial level.The land system has given local governments a monopoly position in the land market.Local governments can develop the economy by controlling the structure and quantity of land supply to create political achievements,while the investment of industrial land is the most effective way to drive GDP.At the same time,the reform of the tax-sharing system has increased the financial pressure of local governments,so that local governments can rely on "land sales" to obtain direct and high fiscal revenue.In addition,during the transitional period of the economy,the discriminatory land supply strategy of local governments for industrial and commercial land has not been changed,which has resulted in a structural imbalance in the current supply of industrial land that is much higher than residential and commercial land,leading to the distortion of land prices and inefficient allocation of land resources.As the process of urbanization accelerates,continuing to deepen the market-oriented reform of land elements and improving the performance evaluation system are the keys to improving the efficiency of land resource allocation and optimizing the mode of economic development.