Game Analysis Of Risk Sharing In "The Belt And Road" Infrastructure PPP Projects

“The Belt and Road” initiative is a national top-level strategy for allround opening up to outside in the new era of China,infrastructure connectivity is a priority area of development.With the acceleration of the industrialization and urbanization process of countries along the "The Belt and Road",their infrastructure investment needs are increasingly exuberant.However,due to the constraints of their regional economic development level and government financial resources,there is a serious shortage of funds available for infrastructure construction.Therefore,the contradiction between economic development and infrastructure construction in the areas along the route is increasingly intensified.As a new model,PPP can effectively solve the above problems.Given that most of the PPP project quantity is big,cycle is long,risk factors and complex,so this article on how to establish the fair and reasonable risk sharing scheme as a starting point,with all the way " area" infrastructure PPP project as the research object,using the bargaining game method to study its risk sharing problem,aimed at "area" infrastructure implementation of PPP mode to provide guidance and reference,in order to reduce the PPP mode risk loss,the realization of the parties "mutually beneficial and win-win".This paper has five parts.The first part mainly expounds the background,significance,main contents,methods and innovation points of the topic,and sorts out and analyzes existing literatures from the perspectives of PPP model risk identification and PPP model risk sharing.The second part mainly describes the PPP mode,risk identification,risk sharing,and the related theory of game theory,on this basis,established the "area" the body of the infrastructure PPP project risk allocation,namely,the host country government,Chinese enterprises and third-party financial institutions,and from the macro,meso and micro three levels of "area" infrastructure PPP project risk identification,and then determine the object of its risk sharing.The third part is the focus of this paper,which constructs the bargaining game model of incomplete information risk initial allocation and redistribution in "The Belt and Road" infrastructure PPP project.As the host government is the initiator of the project and occupies an advantageous position in the negotiation,Chinese enterprises and third-party financial institutions will consciously form an "alliance" to bargain with the government.In the initial allocation of risk,a bargaining game model of double mutual deterrence under the condition of incomplete information is constructed.Next,Chinese enterprises and thirdparty financial institutions will carry out internal redistribution of risks Shared by the "alliance".During the redistribution process,a bargaining model based on different bidding orders of participants under the condition of incomplete information is constructed,so as to obtain a reasonable risk sharing ratio among the three parties.Then the solution of the equation is simulated numerically and the conclusion that the discount factor and bidding order of each participant have an effect on the risk sharing ratio is drawn.The fourth part analyzes the specific case of Colombo port city in Sri Lanka and verifies the conclusion with the valuation method,and puts forward relevant policy Suggestions for Chinese enterprises participating in the "The Belt and Road" infrastructure PPP project.Finally,according to the conclusion,it puts forward the corresponding policy Suggestions for Chinese government and enterprises in transnational PPP projects,as well as the prospect of the future research direction.