Comparison Research Between MCP And PAB Bidding Mechanism In Generation Market Based On Evolutionary Game

As electricity market reform goes deeper,the selection of bidding mechanism is crucially important as a significant part of the power generation reform,which affects the stability of the whole electricity market.This paper establish a fair,equitable and scientific index evaluation system in order to comprehensively study two basic bidding mechanisms market clearing price(MCP)and pay-as-bid(PAB),and on this basis,adopting multi-agent based approach to modeling simulation power market bidding behavior based on evolutionary game theory,using quantitative analysis method,thus conducting a comparative study of above-mentioned biding mechanisms objectively.The main work of this paper is as follows:This paper studies the electric power reform policy in recent years,and understands the current situation of electricity reform in China.After reading a large amount of literature and knowing the practical background and significance of this topic,we summarized the domestic and foreign research achievements of the two basic bidding mechanisms.Evolutionary game relevant theory is systematically studied,including the difference between evolutionary game theory and traditional game theory,the basic analysis process,the model of choice in the process of limited rationality,evolutionary dynamics and final evolutionary stable strategy,and proposing a brief analysis of the application of evolutionary game theory in social economics,all this studies of evolutionary game theory provide a theoretical support for researching dynamic evolution process of electricity market.Relevant theories of power generation market are studied,including the definition of power market,six basic elements,two basic trading patterns and two kinds of bidding mechanisms mainly discussed in this paper.And model the power plant,which is the major player in the power generation market,thereby establishing cost function and expected profit function for power plant.Based on the above theory,and combining index selection principles,a comprehensive evaluation system of bidding index is constructed.The merits of the two mechanisms are analyzed based on four levels,respectively are market behavior,market economy,market stability and fairness.The quantitative calculation formulas of various indexes are proposed after the in-depth analysis of the indexes,and applying the analytic hierarchy process to assign weights to each indicator.Furthermore,to build a simulation platform for power market with the above-mentioned theory and modeling,power market bidding simulation model is performed on Visual C++ 6.0 platform,simulating the perfect competition market behavior of fixed load under two mechanisms,and using evolutionary game theory to analyze market behavior,after which we obtaining a qualitative comparative conclusion:Under the hypotheses of modeling and power plant simulation environment in this paper,there is a intense game between power plants with the higher volatility of quotations and quotas under the MCP mechanism,and power plants have a greater tendency to adjust their quotations,however,the market eventually reaches a stable equilibrium in some cases.Meanwhile the volatility of transaction price is higher under the PAB mechanism and has certain risks to the power plant.And then the simulation data is brought into the comprehensive evaluation index system of the bidding mechanism to calculate each index,the comprehensive evaluation conclusion is obtained by calculating the simulation data.The conclusion is that PAB bidding mechanism shows greater advantages under the index evaluation system in this article.