Study On The Autonomy Of The Owners Of The Spcial Maintenance Funds For Housing In Chinr

The special maintenance fund for residence has been founded with the development of reform of the housing system and estate market in China.At present,the fund is escrowed by the local government in most areas in C hina.However,the funding system's function has been restricted to some extend due to the shift of owners' identity,the development of spontaneous organizations for community mutual property and public affairs and problems emerging from the existing management system,which has incurred some conflicts and disputes.At the same time,owners with capital ownership have a stronger demand for special funds for residential maintenance.Part of the communities in cities like Shanghai and Chengdu have acquired autonomy by owners while communities in most areas of C hina have just started to attempt autonomy on account of the influence of cognition,consciousness,governance environment,etc.In order to effectively solve the implementation difficulties of owners' autonomy in special maintenance fund for residence,we should further improve the efficiency of capital use and effectively prevent and solve conflicts and disputes.In this paper,the author has deeply studied the operation and effect of special maintenance fund for residence,analyzed the restiction factors for the owners' autonomy of the funds and concluded with suggestions of strong pertinence and feasibility on the basis of reality with questionnaires,interviews,case studies,statistical analysis,etc.The author firstly consults the related literature and special mainte nance fund for residence,after comparing the results of research and analysis,and carrying out on-the-spot investigation and interview,combined with the reality of society,making residential special maintenance fund owners Autonomy Q uestionnaire;secondly,using self-designed questionnaire as tools,deeply analyzes of influencing factors that restricts capital owners of residential special maintenance;finally,the results of the analysis are summarized,and put forward the operation scheme which helpful for the implementation of residential special maintenance funds of the owners of autonomy.The conclusions are as follows:(1)The gender,age and culture degree,occupation attribute(within the system or outside the system),residence,family income,housing property(commercial housing or welfare housing)of the owners and whether they enjoyed welfare care can cause no obvious differences between management preference for the fund and behavior expectation.(2)To know whether the use of maintenance funds,maintenance funds,whether maintenance funds have enabled conditions,learning experience,the maintenance evaluation output is a positive or negative effect(positive or negative evaluation evaluation),whether can achieve autonomy(whether the solution maintenance funding policy,whether there is willingness to cooperate governance)the owners of residential,is set up in the industry is expected to have a significant impact on the governance of preferences and behaviors of maintenance funds on.O verall,know maintenance fund owners in the "owners" and "industry executives may" score higher than do not know the owners of maintenance funds;use of maintenance funds of the owners in the "owners" and "industry executives may" was significantly higher than that of no use of maintenance fund owners know;maintenance funds enabling conditions for owners in the "owners" and "industry executives may" score higher than do not know the owners of maintenance funds have enabled conditions;learning experience of the o wners in the "owners" and "industry supervisor can" score higher than no learning experience of the owners;positive evaluation of maintenance the capital owners in the "owners" and "industry executives may" scored significantly higher than the negative evaluation of the maintenance funds that can realize the maintenance fund owners;autonomy The owners in the "owners" and "industry executives may" score higher than that can achieve the autonomous maintenance fund owners;cooperation governance intention of residential property owners in the "owners" and "industry executives may" score higher than no cooperative governance of the residential property owners will.The owners of the district owners who have become the industry committee are significantly highe r in the "owner autonomy" and "the business supervisor's good possibility" than the community owners who have not established the industry committee.Information transparency has no significant difference on the owners' scores on "owner autonomy" and "business supervisor's good possibility".(3)On the whole,the owners have a high acknowledgement of behavior expectation that “the government can manage ”,but they do not completely deny the possibility of the owner' autonomous management.At the same time,there is no significant difference between the owner self-management or the government escrow in maintenance funds.The owner committee members have higher acknowledgement of autonomy than that of government escrow.For those who can manage the maintenance funds,the members of the industry committee have no obvious difference in their behavior expectations between the government and their owners.This indicates that the owners' management preference is inclined to owners' autonomy.