Study On Bargaining Game In A Supply Chain With Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric information is becoming a common problem in supply chain.For example,retailers have more access to sales information,which enable retailers to make more accurate market demand forecast.However,companies are unwilling to give up their negotiating advantage by sharing their private information.Therefore,asymmetric information undermines supply chain's efficiency.Previous studies on asymmetric information are mostly based on principal-agent framework.Meanwhile,contracts are closed by negotiations in a range of industries including semiconductor,medical,automobile,agricultural,and construction.Based on these two considerations,the purpose of this paper is to study how the status of information would affect supply chain in different trade modes.The purpose of this paper is to study how information will influence participants'actions in different situations,including information-shared and asymmetric information situations;static principal-agent and dynamic bargaining situations.A profit sharing contract is utilized to coordinate the supply chain in this paper,which is divided into six different situations:one-to-one static trade,one-to-one dynamic trade and one-to-two dynamic trade under both shared information and asymmetric information situations.We gain the conclusion that in the information-shared one-to-one static trade seller is in the absolute dominant position.High-efficiency buyer can earn more profit through the privatization of his processing cost information in asymmetric information situation.And buyer gains more bargaining power from substitutional sourcing channel in one-to-two dynamic trade.In principal-agent static framework low-efficiency buyer always reveals the true information and high-efficiency buyer always lies.Meanwhile,in dynamic bargaining trade low-efficiency buyer still always reveals the true information but high-efficiency buyer may tend to share the true information for more profit.