Analysis Of Household Appliance Sales Price Based On Game Theory

Under the current fierce competition and changes in customer's need, the enterprises aren't on their own, and they began to respond to the demands of responding to change of the market. Therefore, supply chain emerges with the tide of the times. The cooperation among supply chain enterprises is both competitive and cooperative. The enterprises not only ensure to protect their self-interest are not violated, but also achieve the best supply chain performance, and this makes enterprise decision quite complex. Supply chain is a complex and colossal distributed system, and supply chain management is a new enterprise relationship model in essence. From the aspect of current household appliance market sales channels in the supply chain situation, the author thinks that the theme of supply chain is more of a relation between supply and demand in the manufacturer and retailer as well as the large-scale market. This article studies on the cooperation and competition of the supply chain node, around the supply chain node cooperation and competition relationship coordination of enterprises by using the game theory and information economics principle. The thesis is organized as the following:Part 1: Introduced the concepts of supply chain and supply chain management and their characteristics respectively. Then, summarized the current research results and development of supply chain and game theories.Part 2: Introduce the game theory and its some fundamental concepts, analyzed the application of game theory and information economics in supply chain, and pointed out the feasibility of usage of game theory in supply chain.Part 3: Researched the price model of household appliance. Obtain the cooperation price under the incomplete information and the long-time combination relationship: realize the reasonable distribution of profits between manufacturer and retailer.Part 4: Researched the design of incentive mechanism between manufacturer and retailer under incomplete information and complete information. Under the conditions of complete information, the manufacturer can observe the vendor's efforts for cooperation, through the adjustment of incentive compensation, incentives and supervision carried out. Under incomplete information, manufacturers and distributors choose the risk-neutral or risk averse, the optimal effort level is less than sellers of complete information the optimal level of effort under, but it cannot achieve the Pareto optimal level of effort optimal. So we can achieve Pareto optimal through sharing information, solve the uncertainty during the business cooperation between manufacturers and distributors to achieve mutual long-term cooperation.