| The climate warming caused by greenhouse gases is one of the most serious environmental problems facing mankind today, and agriculture is the important source of greenhouse gas emissions, its impact on the global climate cannot be ignored. Traditional agriculture is highly dependent on the input of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other petrochemical raw materials, which makes the growing problem of agricultural non-point source pollution on air and soil foregrounding, and the low carbon agricultural production chartered by low pollution, low emission and low consumption has become the new trend of development. In addition, good low carbon agriculture system has strong carbon sinks function; it can offset most agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the development and popularization of low carbon agriculture is of great significance.However, the low carbon agriculture in China encountered a lot of problems in the actual process, especially, the numerous conflicts of interest between the participation subjects involving in low carbon agriculture practice has seriously restricted the development of low carbon agriculture. To establish the balance mechanism among the stakeholders is the key to develop low carbon agriculture. This paper innovatively combined three main stakeholders and the development of low carbon agriculture, using evolutionary game theory to analyze the game behavior of both sides of government and agricultural enterprises, agricultural enterprises and farmers in the process of developing low carbon agriculture, inquiring into how the decision-making behavior of parties interact each other in the process of traditional mode of agricultural production turning to low carbon production, and using the numerical simulation method to make further explanation for partial game results.Based on stating the theory knowledge and literature review of low carbon agriculture and evolutionary game, this paper builds an evolutionary game framework which contains the governments, agricultural enterprises and farmers, establishes two groups of evolutionary game models: government and agricultural enterprise, agricultural enterprise and farmer, and established the corresponding replicator dynamics equation, analyzing the dynamic evolution process, evolutionary stable strategy and corresponding conditions for subject’s low carbon decision of behavior. The results showed that three stakeholders’ choices of strategy were dependent on the initial state and their choices of some key parameters. Tripartite benefit and sustainable development of low-carbon agriculture will be finally realized by following ways: for the government, encouraging agricultural enterprises to implement low-carbon production by giving them subsidies, carbon tax returns and other measures; for agricultural enterprises, imparting low-carbon production technologies, improving conditions of production facilities and sharing profits to spur farmers to cooperate with them. |
