| Environmental resources are characterized by scarcity,external economy and public attribute.Negative externality,non-competitiveness and non-exclusiveness caused by their characteristics lead to market failure in the operation of market mechanism in environmental protection.Relying on market mechanism and the definition of environmental property rights,the coordinated development of environment and economy can not be achieved.Appropriate government intervention in economic activities can correct the “external diseconomy” of market behavior and the "tragedy of public land" of natural resources.Therefore the government needs to formulate environmental protection policies and to implement environmental supervision and management so as to realize the strategy of sustainable and coordinated development of economy,ecology and society.The goal of environmental supervision is to achieve the sustainable and coordinated development of economy,ecology and society,to alleviate the environmental pressure of environmental destruction,ecological imbalance and over-utilization of resources,and to protect and strengthen the balance and renewal of the environmental system.China has established carbon trading pilot markets in nine provinces,municipalities or autonomous regions.And the unified carbon trading market covering the whole country has been officially launched.The experience and innovation of the carbon trading markets have laid a theoretical and practical foundation for the establishment of the unified carbon trading market,and have provided a new perspective for analysis of environmental supervision.This thesis titled “Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation under Carbon Market Mechanism”,using statistical and econometric methods,game theory and optimization theory,study the environmental regulation problems such as the motivational goal of environmental supervision,the choice of environmental regulation tools,the carbon trading market,the corporate environmental behavior under the environmental regulation and the implementation of environmental protection policies,etc.This study divided into seven parts.The first chapter is the introduction,which mainly introduces and explains the background and significance,research methods and thinking,domestic and foreign research status,content structure and arrangement,main innovation points of environmental regulation game research under the pricr mechanism of carbon market,and summarizes the research plan of the full text;The second chapter is the related theories of environmental supervision,which mainly combings the content,principles and methods of environmental supervision,and at the same time,explains and reviews the motivation and policies of China environmental supervision.This paper analyzes the evolution process of environmental regulatory policies and tools from three perspectives: the development of environmental regulatory theory,the foreign environmental regulatory model and the evolution of China’s environmental system.The third chapter studies the operation performance of the carbon trading markets in China.Based on the three characteristics of market performance including the trading volume,trading quota and trading days,three maturity indices: development degree,coordination degree and coordinated development degree are constructed to measure the operational and maturity performance of carbon trading markets and explores the design of the operation mechanism of the national unified carbon trading market.The fourth chapter studies the operation mechanism of the carbon trading markets in China,analyzes the trading volume,trading price and trading frequency of the carbon trading markets,compares the operating mechanisms of the carbon trading markets,and conducts time series analysis on the monthly transaction price data to explore the trend and seasonality of price fluctuation.Then the monthly average price of carbon market is predicted.In the fifth chapter,based on the principal-agent theory in game theory,a multi-level principal-agent game theory model is established to study the incentive mechanism involving different behavior subjects in the supervision process,and a multi-task principal-agent model is established to analyze the behavioral choice of enterprises in environmental supervision when both the task of energy saving and emission reduction and the task of profit chasing exist at the same time.In the sixth chapter,we study the regulatory mechanism of environmental information disclosure using evolutionary game theory analysis method,and compares the regulatory system of carbon trading pilot markets,which enriches the structural system.In the seventh chapter,we put forward relevant policy recommendations on the basis of summarizing the contents of the preceding chapters.The main conclusions and shortcomings of this study are summarized,and the future research is prospected.The main conclusions of this thesis:1.Based on the three maturity indices of trading volume,trading quota and trading days of carbon trading markets,three maturity indices: the development degree index,coordination degree index and coordination development degree index are constructed to measure the operational level of carbon trading market.The phenomenon that he development level stages and coordination level stages of the carbon trading markets in China are significantly inconsistent with each other and the development decline trend are discovered.It shows that the development of carbon trading markets in China is not balanced in development,and that individual markets are still in the middle stage of development.2.Based on the time series analysis of monthly transaction price data in China’s carbon trading market,this paper uses the exponential smoothing method and the autoregressive moving average model to explore the changing rules of price fluctuation,such as trend,seasonal,level,etc.,then realize the monthly average price forecast of carbon market.And it also compares and analyzes the price operation mechanism of China’s carbon trading market from various angles,such as the total quota,the quota allocation method,the market price stabilization mechanism,the market inclusion mechanism,the market compliance mechanism and the market punishment mechanism,it reveals the difference of price mechanism in carbon trading market.3.Through the analysis of the quadripartite game among the public,the government,the environmental regulatory agencies and enterprises,it is concluded that:(1)The higher the cost of government regulation,the higher the possibility of collusion between the regulatory agencies and enterprises;the greater the collusion penalty of the government environmental regulatory agencies,the smaller the government subsidies to enterprises for emission reduction,the smaller the possibility of collusion.(2)The greater the transfer payment provided by enterprises to environmental agencies,the greater the rent-seeking interest of environmental regulatory agencies and the higher the possibility of being captured by enterprises.The government should increase the probability of verification.The greater the punishment of government collusion with environmental regulatory agencies,the greater the risk of collusion with environmental regulatory agencies.The government may decrease the probability of verification.4.We establish a principal-agent model to study the game process of government,regulatory agencies,and compliance companies.(1)The greater the probability of environmental problem discovery,the greater the sharing factor of environmental regulators;the more the regulatory effort costs of regulatory agencies,the higher the level of environmental supervision technology or the regulatory requirements,the greater the variance of random environmental problems,the smaller the sharing factor of environmental regulators;(2)There is multi-task nature in corporate economic behavior.The profit-seeking of enterprises and the participate in carbon trading behavior are alternative tasks.And the reasonable control of the alternative factor between tasks will effectively promote the company’s compliance behavior.5.We establish an evolutionary game model of information disclosure supervision.Through numerical simulation,we reveals the impact on evolutionary results of changes in factors such as initial value of policy selection,strictness of supervision,additional income of corporate illegal sewage discharge,and average loss of environmental supervision institutions from lax supervision.Through the optimization model,it is found that in order to obtain the accurate emission information,we only need to observe the equilibrium price of quota,and put forward the suggestion that the price of quota in carbon market should be linked to the marginal penalty.It is hoped that through the research of this thesis,we can provide certain theoretical basis and reference value for the design of effective environmental protection policy and environmental supervision mechanism. |
