Research On Dominant Enterprises' Selection Of Platform Openness In High-tech Service Innovation Network

With the constantly deepening of servitization in manufacturing industry, users' needs is becoming more and more diversified and customized. It is difficult for enterprises to meet users' needs on their own strength. Providing users with more rich and perfect products and services by the implementation of the platform strategy, the openness of their own resources and the help of the third party strength has become the developing direction of many enterprises. Opening platform can introduce collaborators, inspire the innovation of complementary products, enrich the platform functions, and attract more users to adopt platform product; on the other hand, opening platform means that the dominant enterprises give up the exclusive right of partial resources, reduce the capability of controlling platform and earning profit. It is an important strategic decision for dominant enterprises to decide whether to open the platform and choose the suitable degree of opening, which plays an important role in the development of the whole innovation network. Therefore, it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the selection of platform openness of the dominant enterprises in high-tech service innovation network.On the basis of predecessors'research, this paper analyzes the structure and characteristics of high-tech service innovation network and platform openness, reveals the influence of dominant enterprises' capability of innovation and network control, network effects, complementers' innovation capability, platform difference, as well as competitors'innovation capability and platform openness by the game model which is constructed by selection of optimal platform openness and comparative static analysis. And taking Apple and Google as the dominant enterprises in the mobile innovation network as the case to verify the theoretical reasoning and the model conclusions.The research concludes that there is a U-shaped relationship between dominant enterprises'innovation capability and optimal platform openness; network control capability of platform leader and direct network effects have a positive impact on optimal platform openness; the influence of indirect effects and complementers' innovation capability on optimal platform openness depends on dominant enterprises' innovation capability, which is negative when the innovation capability is weak and is positive when the innovation is strong; platform difference negatively affects the optimal platform openness; competitors' innovation capability and platform openness positively affect the optimal platform openness. The research results for the dominant enterprises'strategic decision in competitive innovation network platform market, especially in how to better play the leverage of open platform, to promote the better development of the innovation network has very important enlightenment and guiding significance.