Study On Contractors’ Opportunistic Behaviors In Public Cultural Projects Based On Evolutionary Theory

In recent years, the government puts a large amount of resources in public cultural infrastructure projects, in order to achieve the powerful strategy of culture. In the process of public cultural infrastructure projects, the information owned by the owner is asymmetric from that by the contractor. The contractor may choose to make use of asymmetric information to take opportunistic behaviors in some cases to pursue its benefits, which would be harmful to the owner’s interests and to the rights of the public to enjoy public culture and would even disrupt government construction market.On the contractor’s opportunistic behaviors, the author has studied many domestic and foreign researches and papers. Under the direction of public-cultural-service theory, the principal-agent theory and motivation theory, the evolutionary game theory is adopted to analyze the strategies of evolutionary equilibrium within three states: the general state, punishment mechanism and subsidy mechanism. Analyze and compared with the results, the conclusion is drawn that subsidy mechanism can significantly affect contractors’ behaviors in some cases.In general states, the owner neither punishes the contractor for its opportunistic behaviors, nor does the owner compensate for the contractor’s none-opportunistic behaviors. The ESS(Evolutionary Stable Strategy) is that the owner won’t supervise and the contractor will take opportunistic behaviors. In punishment mechanism, if the owner supervises and find out the contractor’s opportunistic behaviors, then the owner will charge the contractor for some fine. The ESS is that the contractor still takes opportunistic behaviors but the owner’s supervision depends on the supervision costs. In subsidy mechanism, if the contractor doesn’t take opportunistic behaviors, then it will get some compensation from the owner. The ESS is that the owner won’t supervise and the contractor’s opportunistic behaviors depend on the compensation. On the comprehensive analysis of the evolutionary game results, in public cultural infrastructure projects, punishment mechanism cannot inhibit contractors’ opportunistic behaviors substantively, while subsidy mechanism can significantly affect contractors’ behaviors in some cases.According to the evolutionary results, this paper has put forward some suggestions as follows: the owner and the contractor establish long-term cooperation mechanism to seek long-term interests; establish an incentive mechanism which is based on honorary incentive and supplemented with monetary incentives; establish an improved and standardized management mechanism and use various regulatory means; expand the project scope and gradually establish system management network for public projects.The innovation of this paper is applying evolutionary game theory to inhibiting contractor’s opportunistic behaviors in public cultural infrastructure projects. This paper has built evolutionary game models in three states, compared with the results and achieved the conclusions.