Study On The Game Of Construction And Operation For Projects Of Public Cultural Servicing Facilities

The third plenary session of the18th central committee of the communist partyfirst proposed:“Build the modern public cultural service system.” The committee alsoappointed:“Bring in competitive mechanism and promote the social development ofpublic cultural service. Encourage social forces and social capital to join the buildingof public cultural service system and foster nonprofit cultural organizations.” In thecontext of cultural development and prosperity, the implement of public culturalservicing facility projects also comes to a new stage of development.Compared with other construction projects, there exist paradoxes in projects ofpublic cultural servicing facilities, such as adverse depreciation, coordinate drift,deviation of construction and operation and so on. However, the original projectsdecision-making methods cannot meet the requirements. All the above highlights aquestion: the effect of cultural influence is bound to the cost compensation inoperating, so the issue of compensation needs to be considered beforehand. Based onthe stakeholders of public cultural project with game theory and compensation issues,and on the foundation of Nash equilibrium、 the social equilibrium by Debreu、 theProbability choice theory by Luce、 and the Quantal Response Equilibrium byMcKelvey-Palfrey, this thesis introduces and prove the core concept of the boundedlyrational generalized Nash equilibrium theory and proved the Existence theorem ofboundedly rational generalized Nash equilibrium by the Fixed Point theorem ofKakutani. Under the market mechanism and using the boundedly rational generalizedNash equilibrium theory, this thesis analyzes the boundedly rational game for thestakeholders in the PPP of public cultural projects. The main works are as follows:1.Summarize the development context of Nash equilibrium and introduceprojection alternative iterative algorithm to solve generalized Nash equilibrium issues.Based on a quasi-variational inequality formulation for the generalized Nash game,this thesis modifies a projection algorithm for finding a common element of the set ofsolutions to generalized Nash equilibrium and quasi-variational inequality. The globalconvergence of this algorithm is proved under certain conditions, and preliminarynumerical results demonstrate that the proposed method is reliable and efficient inpractice. 2.Based on the boundedly rational generalized Nash equilibrium theory, weanalyzes the generating mechanism of prisoners’ dilemma among the stakeholderswhen the public cultural projects are outsourced.3.In the mode of PPP, the relevant stakeholder relations of public culturalprojects have shifted from the traditional principal-agent relations, which are amongthe government, the agency company of projects and the social public, to the InterestGame relations, which is between the owner and the contractor. This thesis uses theboundedly rational generalized Nash equilibrium to study the generating mechanismand operating principles of the prisoners’ dilemma between the owner and thecontractor. Under the condition of the third party of compensation in this game, if theowner and the contractor base on the expected probability to adjust their strategy, thenthey will arrive at bounded rationality Nash equilibrium.4.In each construction and operation period of public cultural projects, the ownerand contractor study the gain matrix of prisoner’s dilemma in last phase of the projectand using the results to adjust the construction and operation strategies in nextprojects. It also illustrates that the process of construction and operation of publiccultural projects is a process of repeated game between the owner and contractor.