Analysis Of Effects Of Access To Private Hospital On The Performance Of Medical Service Industry And The Researches On Relevant Regulation Policy

The marketization of the medical industry is an important part of the Medical and Health System Reform.Encouraging the development of private hospitals is an important measure of the marketization of the medical industry.As to private hospitals,because of its products and services are priced by market mechanism and the characteristic of clear property rights,which promote competition and enhance social welfare to a certain extent.However,can the entrance deregulation of private hospital promote competition,reduce the burden of medical expenses and improve the quality of medical care,thereby increasing social welfare? That's what scholars have questioned.Therefore,it's necessary to inspection and analysis the effects of competition brought by the entrance of many private hospitals.As the information asymmetry in medical service market,medical service providers take advantages of information to induce patients' demand,combined with mechanism of third-party payment,which reduce the price elasticity of demand for patients,thus strengthening providers' motivation of induction of medical care,and the provision of shoddy services.Especially when hospitals increase in the market,benefits of original markets are shared and reduce original hospitals' incomes.So providers are increasingly induce the demands and make fake medical under competitive environment,which have a negative impact on controlling medical costs and improving service quality.In this regard,background the New Medical Reform in 2009,to explore the competitive effects of entrance of private hospitals and research the impact of cost and quality factors.Then put forward the corresponding regulation policies.In this paper,at first using the method of econometric analysis to carry out empirical test.Analyze the impact of competition on the cost of medical expenses and medical service.Secondly,make the game model of controlling the medical expenses and quality is constructed respectively,which is based on the main body of the medical service market,to look for reasons of the competition effect in the empirical is analyzed,analyze needs of regulation.Thirdly,based on the previous findings,built the regulatory framework for the construction of the health care market.According to the study,it was found that in the new year of Medical Reform,the number of private hospitals increased and the competition degree of medical servicemarket increased significantly.However,regardless of the outpatient or hospitalized patients,the total cost of per capita medical treatment increased significantly with the increase of competition.The cost of per capita drugs was particularly significant,and the cost of examination was decreased with the competition.The quality of outpatient medical service was not significantly correlated with the degree of competition in statistics.On the basis of empirical analysis,the article uses the incomplete information game model to analyze the causes of the failure of the competition mechanism through the analysis of the three mains' behaviors that includes governments,hospitals and patients in the medical service market.And construct the incentive restraints applicable to the development of the medical service market in China Capacity of the regulation system.This paper may have the following innovations:(1)To social welfare-oriented,use the number of private hospitals to quantify the degree of competition,through empirical validating the impact of private hospital accessary on medical costs and quality.(2)Based on the evolutionary game and the Bayesian game,the moral hazard and the tendency of main behaviors in medical service market are analyzed.Revealing the reasons why the competitive effect is non-significant.Put forward the necessity to strengthen supervision.(3)Designed a market system for medical service with public participation in governance,and put forward Incentive-Compatible regulation policy according to the behavior characteristics of each subject.