Research On Price Decisions Considering Customers Sharing In O2O Distribution Channels

With the rapid development of Internet and mobile Internet,O2O business models continue to be concerned about, more and more enterprises have joined the ranks of O2O business model development. On the one hand, O2O make traditional consumer feel more efficient, effective, on the other hand,O2O emphasize on interaction and cooperation online and offline, and in order to increase sales, online retailer stores and offline retailer stores share their customer flow. But cooperative joint for online retailer store and offline retailer store also allow both sides to face some challenges and problems, as a separate business entity, such as JD.com and TangJiu convenience stores, Intime Retail Company and Tmall stores:(1) If the products of two retailers are different, how to describe both market demand quantitatively. (2) Both sides how to decide the best selling prices in different competitive structures, such as Betrand game and Stackelberg game. (3) Customer sharing ratio of any party will influence each other’s best selling price and sales profit, but how the customer sharing ratio influence them and what is the influence are also the problems. Therefore, for above three issues, this paper deduce the market demand of competitive products and complementary products, then this paper establish Betrand game model and Stackelberg game model respectively, and find out the best decisions, at last this paper use a concrete computing case to analyze the impact of customer sharing ratio on their best selling price and their profits.Firstly, this paper set related parameters to deduce the market demand function for competitive products and complementary products according to some references. Next Betrand game model and Stackelberg game model are constructed to find the optimal pricing decisions. Followed by theoretical and numerical analysis, some relevant conclusions are derived:(1) whether the products are competitive or complementary, the greater of customers sharing ratio of one channel, the higher the optimal sales price of this channel, but the lower of the optimal sales price of the other channel. While for both kinds of products, the supply chain profit in Stackelberg game model is always higher that that is in Betrand game model.(2) As for the competitive products, the increase of customers share ratio of one channel will lead to the decrease profit of this channel, the increase profit of the other channel in both Betrand model and Stackelberg model.(3) AS for the competitive products, when considering customers sharing, the supply chain profit changes in different degree with customers sharing ratio in different model, and it is higher than the supply chain profit that is in situation that retailers don’t share customers with each other in Stackelberg model, while lower in Betrand model. But for complementary products, the supply chain profit increases with the customers sharing ratio, and when customers sharing ratio reach a certain number, the supply chain profit is higher than that is in situation that retailers don’t share customers with each other in both Stackelberg model and Betrand model.