The Solution Of Cooperative Game Based On Human Fairness Conception

The major object of Cooperative Game theory is to find proper imputations that can reasonably distribute the costs or benefits generated among the grand coalition. It has been widely employed to resolve the real scenario problems. Generally, three principals need to be satisfied should the solution can maintain the steadiness of the coalition, for one Individual rationality, for two Pareto efficiency and for the last one the fairness. The first two properties are the premises of feasible solution, while the final one is considered by the scholar to be one of the core issues in Cooperative Game theory since the fairness of a solution is closely linked to the steadiness of coalition. Fairness, however, is a thorny issue faced by scholars due to the diversified conceptions of individuals with which different life experiences, cultures and beliefs regarding fairness they hold. So it is commonly acknowledged that a unified solution for Cooperative Game is unreality. In this paper, two solution concepts that meet the individual common fairness concept are developed. These two concepts are more compatible with the decision patterns of human behaviors. And we anticipate that these two solutions would be widely accepted by the decision-makers.The whole thesis consists of five parts. The beginning chapter gives a brief introduction to the differences between cooperative and non-cooperative game, then we come into the topic of the article: the solution of cooperative game. Followed by that, we characterize the standard formula of cooperative game and bring in the universal object of the passage. The second chapter presents the literature reviews regarding the solution of cooperative game and its application from both domestic and international scholars. After that, the article points out the issues existed in current research statue and clarify the target of this thesis.The third chapter deals with the issue of fairness of Cooperative Game. The paper tries to incorporate the psychology and behaviors existed in real decision-making scenario. The reasonability of the fairness of allocation results are usually builds on some sort of subjective judgment. Before allocation, each participant will surely make prediction about the pending allocation. And precisely, it is this prediction provides the criterion of fairness of distribution. Next, participants will compare the final result with previous prediction and they think it is a fail and unfair allocation if the difference between these two results is significant.The fourth chapter is the continuation of the formal chapter. In reality, people have altruism spirit and members within an organization also possess collective spirit.So it is reasonable for the members to gain the coalition welfare. In addition, people tend to compare with others. In order to stimulate their willingness of improving the coalition welfare, it is important to take their appeals for the allocation fairness into consideration. Therefore, fairness is what the coalition participant pursues as well as the coalition welfare. Is it possible that these two objects can be achieved simultaneously? In this thesis, I propose a class of solution that satisfies both maximum coalition welfare property and fairness property.In conclusion, the fifth chapter points out the insufficiencies of the whole thesis and presents a brief direction for further development.